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PERLSEC(1)                            Perl Programmers Reference Guide                            PERLSEC(1)



NAME
       perlsec - Perl security

DESCRIPTION
       Perl is designed to make it easy to program securely even when running with extra privileges, like
       setuid or setgid programs.  Unlike most command line shells, which are based on multiple substitution
       passes on each line of the script, Perl uses a more conventional evaluation scheme with fewer hidden
       snags.  Additionally, because the language has more builtin functionality, it can rely less upon
       external (and possibly untrustworthy) programs to accomplish its purposes.

SECURITY VULNERABILITY CONTACT INFORMATION
       If you believe you have found a security vulnerability in Perl, please email
       perl5-security-report@perl.org with details.  This points to a closed subscription, unarchived
       mailing list.  Please only use this address for security issues in the Perl core, not for modules
       independently distributed on CPAN.

SECURITY MECHANISMS AND CONCERNS
   Taint mode
       Perl automatically enables a set of special security checks, called taint mode, when it detects its
       program running with differing real and effective user or group IDs.  The setuid bit in Unix
       permissions is mode 04000, the setgid bit mode 02000; either or both may be set.  You can also enable
       taint mode explicitly by using the -T command line flag. This flag is strongly suggested for server
       programs and any program run on behalf of someone else, such as a CGI script. Once taint mode is on,
       it's on for the remainder of your script.

       While in this mode, Perl takes special precautions called taint checks to prevent both obvious and
       subtle traps.  Some of these checks are reasonably simple, such as verifying that path directories
       aren't writable by others; careful programmers have always used checks like these.  Other checks,
       however, are best supported by the language itself, and it is these checks especially that contribute
       to making a set-id Perl program more secure than the corresponding C program.

       You may not use data derived from outside your program to affect something else outside your
       program--at least, not by accident.  All command line arguments, environment variables, locale
       information (see perllocale), results of certain system calls ("readdir()", "readlink()", the
       variable of "shmread()", the messages returned by "msgrcv()", the password, gcos and shell fields
       returned by the "getpwxxx()" calls), and all file input are marked as "tainted".  Tainted data may
       not be used directly or indirectly in any command that invokes a sub-shell, nor in any command that
       modifies files, directories, or processes, with the following exceptions:

       •   Arguments to "print" and "syswrite" are not checked for taintedness.

       •   Symbolic methods

               $obj->$method(@args);

           and symbolic sub references

               &{$foo}(@args);
               $foo->(@args);

           are not checked for taintedness.  This requires extra carefulness unless you want external data
           to affect your control flow.  Unless you carefully limit what these symbolic values are, people
           are able to call functions outside your Perl code, such as POSIX::system, in which case they are
           able to run arbitrary external code.

       •   Hash keys are never tainted.

       For efficiency reasons, Perl takes a conservative view of whether data is tainted.  If an expression
       contains tainted data, any subexpression may be considered tainted, even if the value of the
       subexpression is not itself affected by the tainted data.

       Because taintedness is associated with each scalar value, some elements of an array or hash can be
       tainted and others not.  The keys of a hash are never tainted.

       For example:

           $arg = shift;               # $arg is tainted
           $hid = $arg, 'bar';         # $hid is also tainted
           $line = <>;                 # Tainted
           $line = <STDIN>;            # Also tainted
           open FOO, "/home/me/bar" or die $!;
           $line = <FOO>;              # Still tainted
           $path = $ENV{'PATH'};       # Tainted, but see below
           $data = 'abc';              # Not tainted

           system "echo $arg";         # Insecure
           system "/bin/echo", $arg;   # Considered insecure
                                       # (Perl doesn't know about /bin/echo)
           system "echo $hid";         # Insecure
           system "echo $data";        # Insecure until PATH set

           $path = $ENV{'PATH'};       # $path now tainted

           $ENV{'PATH'} = '/bin:/usr/bin';
           delete @ENV{'IFS', 'CDPATH', 'ENV', 'BASH_ENV'};

           $path = $ENV{'PATH'};       # $path now NOT tainted
           system "echo $data";        # Is secure now!

           open(FOO, "< $arg");        # OK - read-only file
           open(FOO, "> $arg");        # Not OK - trying to write

           open(FOO,"echo $arg|");     # Not OK
           open(FOO,"-|")
               or exec 'echo', $arg;   # Also not OK

           $shout = `echo $arg`;       # Insecure, $shout now tainted

           unlink $data, $arg;         # Insecure
           umask $arg;                 # Insecure

           exec "echo $arg";           # Insecure
           exec "echo", $arg;          # Insecure
           exec "sh", '-c', $arg;      # Very insecure!

           @files = <*.c>;             # insecure (uses readdir() or similar)
           @files = glob('*.c');       # insecure (uses readdir() or similar)

           # In Perl releases older than 5.6.0 the <*.c> and glob('*.c') would
           # have used an external program to do the filename expansion; but in
           # either case the result is tainted since the list of filenames comes
           # from outside of the program.

           $bad = ($arg, 23);          # $bad will be tainted
           $arg, `true`;               # Insecure (although it isn't really)

       If you try to do something insecure, you will get a fatal error saying something like "Insecure
       dependency" or "Insecure $ENV{PATH}".

       The exception to the principle of "one tainted value taints the whole expression" is with the ternary
       conditional operator "?:".  Since code with a ternary conditional

           $result = $tainted_value ? "Untainted" : "Also untainted";

       is effectively

           if ( $tainted_value ) {
               $result = "Untainted";
           } else {
               $result = "Also untainted";
           }

       it doesn't make sense for $result to be tainted.

   Laundering and Detecting Tainted Data
       To test whether a variable contains tainted data, and whose use would thus trigger an "Insecure
       dependency" message, you can use the "tainted()" function of the Scalar::Util module, available in
       your nearby CPAN mirror, and included in Perl starting from the release 5.8.0.  Or you may be able to
       use the following "is_tainted()" function.

           sub is_tainted {
               local $@;   # Don't pollute caller's value.
               return ! eval { eval("#" . substr(join("", @_), 0, 0)); 1 };
           }

       This function makes use of the fact that the presence of tainted data anywhere within an expression
       renders the entire expression tainted.  It would be inefficient for every operator to test every
       argument for taintedness.  Instead, the slightly more efficient and conservative approach is used
       that if any tainted value has been accessed within the same expression, the whole expression is
       considered tainted.

       But testing for taintedness gets you only so far.  Sometimes you have just to clear your data's
       taintedness.  Values may be untainted by using them as keys in a hash; otherwise the only way to
       bypass the tainting mechanism is by referencing subpatterns from a regular expression match.  Perl
       presumes that if you reference a substring using $1, $2, etc., that you knew what you were doing when
       you wrote the pattern.  That means using a bit of thought--don't just blindly untaint anything, or
       you defeat the entire mechanism.  It's better to verify that the variable has only good characters
       (for certain values of "good") rather than checking whether it has any bad characters.  That's
       because it's far too easy to miss bad characters that you never thought of.

       Here's a test to make sure that the data contains nothing but "word" characters (alphabetics,
       numerics, and underscores), a hyphen, an at sign, or a dot.

           if ($data =~ /^([-\@\w.]+)$/) {
               $data = $1;                     # $data now untainted
           } else {
               die "Bad data in '$data'";      # log this somewhere
           }

       This is fairly secure because "/\w+/" doesn't normally match shell metacharacters, nor are dot, dash,
       or at going to mean something special to the shell.  Use of "/.+/" would have been insecure in theory
       because it lets everything through, but Perl doesn't check for that.  The lesson is that when
       untainting, you must be exceedingly careful with your patterns.  Laundering data using regular
       expression is the only mechanism for untainting dirty data, unless you use the strategy detailed
       below to fork a child of lesser privilege.

       The example does not untaint $data if "use locale" is in effect, because the characters matched by
       "\w" are determined by the locale.  Perl considers that locale definitions are untrustworthy because
       they contain data from outside the program.  If you are writing a locale-aware program, and want to
       launder data with a regular expression containing "\w", put "no locale" ahead of the expression in
       the same block.  See "SECURITY" in perllocale for further discussion and examples.

   Switches On the "#!" Line
       When you make a script executable, in order to make it usable as a command, the system will pass
       switches to perl from the script's #!  line.  Perl checks that any command line switches given to a
       setuid (or setgid) script actually match the ones set on the #! line.  Some Unix and Unix-like
       environments impose a one-switch limit on the #!  line, so you may need to use something like "-wU"
       instead of "-w -U" under such systems.  (This issue should arise only in Unix or Unix-like
       environments that support #! and setuid or setgid scripts.)

   Taint mode and @INC
       When the taint mode ("-T") is in effect, the "." directory is removed from @INC, and the environment
       variables "PERL5LIB" and "PERLLIB" are ignored by Perl. You can still adjust @INC from outside the
       program by using the "-I" command line option as explained in perlrun. The two environment variables
       are ignored because they are obscured, and a user running a program could be unaware that they are
       set, whereas the "-I" option is clearly visible and therefore permitted.

       Another way to modify @INC without modifying the program, is to use the "lib" pragma, e.g.:

         perl -Mlib=/foo program

       The benefit of using "-Mlib=/foo" over "-I/foo", is that the former will automagically remove any
       duplicated directories, while the later will not.

       Note that if a tainted string is added to @INC, the following problem will be reported:

         Insecure dependency in require while running with -T switch

   Cleaning Up Your Path
       For "Insecure $ENV{PATH}" messages, you need to set $ENV{'PATH'} to a known value, and each directory
       in the path must be absolute and non-writable by others than its owner and group.  You may be
       surprised to get this message even if the pathname to your executable is fully qualified.  This is
       not generated because you didn't supply a full path to the program; instead, it's generated because
       you never set your PATH environment variable, or you didn't set it to something that was safe.
       Because Perl can't guarantee that the executable in question isn't itself going to turn around and
       execute some other program that is dependent on your PATH, it makes sure you set the PATH.

       The PATH isn't the only environment variable which can cause problems.  Because some shells may use
       the variables IFS, CDPATH, ENV, and BASH_ENV, Perl checks that those are either empty or untainted
       when starting subprocesses. You may wish to add something like this to your setid and taint-checking
       scripts.

           delete @ENV{qw(IFS CDPATH ENV BASH_ENV)};   # Make %ENV safer

       It's also possible to get into trouble with other operations that don't care whether they use tainted
       values.  Make judicious use of the file tests in dealing with any user-supplied filenames.  When
       possible, do opens and such after properly dropping any special user (or group!)  privileges. Perl
       doesn't prevent you from opening tainted filenames for reading, so be careful what you print out.
       The tainting mechanism is intended to prevent stupid mistakes, not to remove the need for thought.

       Perl does not call the shell to expand wild cards when you pass "system" and "exec" explicit
       parameter lists instead of strings with possible shell wildcards in them.  Unfortunately, the "open",
       "glob", and backtick functions provide no such alternate calling convention, so more subterfuge will
       be required.

       Perl provides a reasonably safe way to open a file or pipe from a setuid or setgid program: just
       create a child process with reduced privilege who does the dirty work for you.  First, fork a child
       using the special "open" syntax that connects the parent and child by a pipe.  Now the child resets
       its ID set and any other per-process attributes, like environment variables, umasks, current working
       directories, back to the originals or known safe values.  Then the child process, which no longer has
       any special permissions, does the "open" or other system call.  Finally, the child passes the data it
       managed to access back to the parent.  Because the file or pipe was opened in the child while running
       under less privilege than the parent, it's not apt to be tricked into doing something it shouldn't.

       Here's a way to do backticks reasonably safely.  Notice how the "exec" is not called with a string
       that the shell could expand.  This is by far the best way to call something that might be subjected
       to shell escapes: just never call the shell at all.

               use English '-no_match_vars';
               die "Can't fork: $!" unless defined($pid = open(KID, "-|"));
               if ($pid) {           # parent
                   while (<KID>) {
                       # do something
                   }
                   close KID;
               } else {
                   my @temp     = ($EUID, $EGID);
                   my $orig_uid = $UID;
                   my $orig_gid = $GID;
                   $EUID = $UID;
                   $EGID = $GID;
                   # Drop privileges
                   $UID  = $orig_uid;
                   $GID  = $orig_gid;
                   # Make sure privs are really gone
                   ($EUID, $EGID) = @temp;
                   die "Can't drop privileges"
                       unless $UID == $EUID  && $GID eq $EGID;
                   $ENV{PATH} = "/bin:/usr/bin"; # Minimal PATH.
                   # Consider sanitizing the environment even more.
                   exec 'myprog', 'arg1', 'arg2'
                       or die "can't exec myprog: $!";
               }

       A similar strategy would work for wildcard expansion via "glob", although you can use "readdir"
       instead.

       Taint checking is most useful when although you trust yourself not to have written a program to give
       away the farm, you don't necessarily trust those who end up using it not to try to trick it into
       doing something bad.  This is the kind of security checking that's useful for set-id programs and
       programs launched on someone else's behalf, like CGI programs.

       This is quite different, however, from not even trusting the writer of the code not to try to do
       something evil.  That's the kind of trust needed when someone hands you a program you've never seen
       before and says, "Here, run this."  For that kind of safety, you might want to check out the Safe
       module, included standard in the Perl distribution.  This module allows the programmer to set up
       special compartments in which all system operations are trapped and namespace access is carefully
       controlled.  Safe should not be considered bullet-proof, though: it will not prevent the foreign code
       to set up infinite loops, allocate gigabytes of memory, or even abusing perl bugs to make the host
       interpreter crash or behave in unpredictable ways. In any case it's better avoided completely if
       you're really concerned about security.

   Security Bugs
       Beyond the obvious problems that stem from giving special privileges to systems as flexible as
       scripts, on many versions of Unix, set-id scripts are inherently insecure right from the start.  The
       problem is a race condition in the kernel.  Between the time the kernel opens the file to see which
       interpreter to run and when the (now-set-id) interpreter turns around and reopens the file to
       interpret it, the file in question may have changed, especially if you have symbolic links on your
       system.

       Fortunately, sometimes this kernel "feature" can be disabled.  Unfortunately, there are two ways to
       disable it.  The system can simply outlaw scripts with any set-id bit set, which doesn't help much.
       Alternately, it can simply ignore the set-id bits on scripts.

       However, if the kernel set-id script feature isn't disabled, Perl will complain loudly that your set-id setid
       id script is insecure.  You'll need to either disable the kernel set-id script feature, or put a C
       wrapper around the script.  A C wrapper is just a compiled program that does nothing except call your
       Perl program.   Compiled programs are not subject to the kernel bug that plagues set-id scripts.
       Here's a simple wrapper, written in C:

           #define REAL_PATH "/path/to/script"
           main(ac, av)
               char **av;
           {
               execv(REAL_PATH, av);
           }

       Compile this wrapper into a binary executable and then make it rather than your script setuid or
       setgid.

       In recent years, vendors have begun to supply systems free of this inherent security bug.  On such
       systems, when the kernel passes the name of the set-id script to open to the interpreter, rather than
       using a pathname subject to meddling, it instead passes /dev/fd/3.  This is a special file already
       opened on the script, so that there can be no race condition for evil scripts to exploit.  On these
       systems, Perl should be compiled with "-DSETUID_SCRIPTS_ARE_SECURE_NOW".  The Configure program that
       builds Perl tries to figure this out for itself, so you should never have to specify this yourself.
       Most modern releases of SysVr4 and BSD 4.4 use this approach to avoid the kernel race condition.

   Protecting Your Programs
       There are a number of ways to hide the source to your Perl programs, with varying levels of
       "security".

       First of all, however, you can't take away read permission, because the source code has to be
       readable in order to be compiled and interpreted.  (That doesn't mean that a CGI script's source is
       readable by people on the web, though.)  So you have to leave the permissions at the socially
       friendly 0755 level.  This lets people on your local system only see your source.

       Some people mistakenly regard this as a security problem.  If your program does insecure things, and
       relies on people not knowing how to exploit those insecurities, it is not secure.  It is often
       possible for someone to determine the insecure things and exploit them without viewing the source.
       Security through obscurity, the name for hiding your bugs instead of fixing them, is little security
       indeed.

       You can try using encryption via source filters (Filter::* from CPAN, or Filter::Util::Call and
       Filter::Simple since Perl 5.8).  But crackers might be able to decrypt it.  You can try using the
       byte code compiler and interpreter described below, but crackers might be able to de-compile it.  You
       can try using the native-code compiler described below, but crackers might be able to disassemble it.
       These pose varying degrees of difficulty to people wanting to get at your code, but none can
       definitively conceal it (this is true of every language, not just Perl).

       If you're concerned about people profiting from your code, then the bottom line is that nothing but a
       restrictive license will give you legal security.  License your software and pepper it with
       threatening statements like "This is unpublished proprietary software of XYZ Corp.  Your access to it
       does not give you permission to use it blah blah blah."  You should see a lawyer to be sure your
       license's wording will stand up in court.

   Unicode
       Unicode is a new and complex technology and one may easily overlook certain security pitfalls.  See
       perluniintro for an overview and perlunicode for details, and "Security Implications of Unicode" in
       perlunicode for security implications in particular.

   Algorithmic Complexity Attacks
       Certain internal algorithms used in the implementation of Perl can be attacked by choosing the input
       carefully to consume large amounts of either time or space or both.  This can lead into the so-called
       Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.

       •   Hash Function - the algorithm used to "order" hash elements has been changed several times during
           the development of Perl, mainly to be reasonably fast.  In Perl 5.8.1 also the security aspect
           was taken into account.

           In Perls before 5.8.1 one could rather easily generate data that as hash keys would cause Perl to
           consume large amounts of time because internal structure of hashes would badly degenerate.  In
           Perl 5.8.1 the hash function is randomly perturbed by a pseudorandom seed which makes generating
           such naughty hash keys harder.  See "PERL_HASH_SEED" in perlrun for more information.

           In Perl 5.8.1 the random perturbation was done by default, but as of 5.8.2 it is only used on
           individual hashes if the internals detect the insertion of pathological data. If one wants for
           some reason emulate the old behaviour (and expose oneself to DoS attacks) one can set the
           environment variable PERL_HASH_SEED to zero to disable the protection (or any other integer to
           force a known perturbation, rather than random).  One possible reason for wanting to emulate the
           old behaviour is that in the new behaviour consecutive runs of Perl will order hash keys
           differently, which may confuse some applications (like Data::Dumper: the outputs of two different
           runs are no longer identical).

           Perl has never guaranteed any ordering of the hash keys, and the ordering has already changed
           several times during the lifetime of Perl 5.  Also, the ordering of hash keys has always been,
           and continues to be, affected by the insertion order.

           Also note that while the order of the hash elements might be randomised, this "pseudoordering"
           should not be used for applications like shuffling a list randomly (use List::Util::shuffle() for
           that, see List::Util, a standard core module since Perl 5.8.0; or the CPAN module
           Algorithm::Numerical::Shuffle), or for generating permutations (use e.g. the CPAN modules
           Algorithm::Permute or Algorithm::FastPermute), or for any cryptographic applications.

       •   Regular expressions - Perl's regular expression engine is so called NFA (Non-deterministic Finite
           Automaton), which among other things means that it can rather easily consume large amounts of
           both time and space if the regular expression may match in several ways.  Careful crafting of the
           regular expressions can help but quite often there really isn't much one can do (the book
           "Mastering Regular Expressions" is required reading, see perlfaq2).  Running out of space
           manifests itself by Perl running out of memory.

       •   Sorting - the quicksort algorithm used in Perls before 5.8.0 to implement the sort() function is
           very easy to trick into misbehaving so that it consumes a lot of time.  Starting from Perl 5.8.0
           a different sorting algorithm, mergesort, is used by default.  Mergesort cannot misbehave on any
           input.

       See <http://www.cs.rice.edu/~scrosby/hash/> for more information, and any computer science textbook
       on algorithmic complexity.

SEE ALSO
       perlrun for its description of cleaning up environment variables.



perl v5.16.2                                     2012-10-25                                       PERLSEC(1)