The JavaTM Cryptography
Extension (JCE) provides a framework and implementations for
encryption, key generation and key agreement, and Message
Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms. Support for encryption includes
symmetric, asymmetric, block, and stream ciphers. The software also
supports secure streams and sealed objects.
JCE was previously an optional package (extension) to the JavaTM 2 SDK, Standard Edition (Java 2 SDK),
versions 1.2.x and 1.3.x. JCE has been integrated into the Java 2 SDK
since the 1.4 release.
JCE is based on the same design
principles found elsewhere in the JCA: implementation independence
and, whenever possible, algorithm independence. It uses the same "provider" architecture.
Providers signed by a trusted entity can be plugged into the JCE
framework, and new algorithms can be added seamlessly.
The JCE API covers:
Symmetric bulk encryption, such as DES, RC2, and IDEA
Symmetric stream encryption, such as RC4
Asymmetric encryption, such as RSA
Password-based encryption (PBE)
Key Agreement
Message Authentication Codes (MAC)
The JDK 5.0 release comes standard with a JCE provider
named "SunJCE", which comes pre-installed and registered
and which supplies the following cryptographic services:
An implementation of the DES (FIPS PUB 46-1), Triple DES, and
Blowfish encryption algorithms in the Electronic Code Book (ECB),
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), Output Feedback
(OFB), and Propagating Cipher Block Chaining (PCBC) modes. (Note:
Throughout this document, the terms "Triple DES" and "DES-EDE" will be
used interchangeably.)
Key generators for generating keys suitable for the DES, Triple
DES, Blowfish, HMAC-MD5, and HMAC-SHA1 algorithms.
An implementation of the MD5 with DES-CBC password-based
encryption (PBE) algorithm defined in PKCS #5.
"Secret-key factories" providing bi-directional conversions
between opaque DES, Triple DES and PBE key objects and transparent
representations of their underlying key material.
An implementation of the Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm
between two or more parties.
A Diffie-Hellman key pair generator for generating a pair of
public and private values suitable for the Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
A Diffie-Hellman algorithm parameter generator.
A Diffie-Hellman "key factory" providing bi-directional
conversions between opaque Diffie-Hellman key objects and transparent
representations of their underlying key material.
Algorithm parameter managers for Diffie-Hellman, DES, Triple
DES, Blowfish, and PBE parameters.
An implementation of the HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1 keyed-hashing
algorithms defined in RFC 2104.
An implementation of the padding scheme described in PKCS #5.
A keystore implementation for the proprietary keystore type
named "JCEKS".
The JCE within the JDK 5.0 includes two software
components:
the framework that defines and supports cryptographic
services that providers can supply implementations for. This framework
includes everything in the javax.crypto package.
a provider named "SunJCE"
Throughout this document, the term "JCE" by itself refers to the JCE
framework in the JDK 5.0. Whenever the JCE provider supplied
with the JDK 5.0 is mentioned, it will be referred to
explicitly as the "SunJCE" provider.
In JDK 5.0, a JCA/JCE provider, SunPKCS11 that acts as a
generic gateway to the native PKCS#11 API has been implemented. PKCS#11
is the de-facto standard for crypto accelerators and also widely used
to access cryptographic smartcards. The administrator/user can
configure this provider to talk any PKCS#11 v2.x compliant token.
Here's an example of the configuration file format.
On Solaris 10, the default Java security provider configuration
has been changed in JDK 5.0 to include an instance of the SunPKCS11
provider that uses the Solaris Cryptographic Framework. It is the
provider with the highest precedence thereby allowing all existing
applications to take advantage of the improved performance on Solaris
10. There is no change in behavior on Solaris 8 and Solaris 9 systems.
As a result of this change, many cryptographic operations will
execute several times as fast as before on all Solaris 10 systems. On
systems with cryptographic hardware acceleration, the performance
improvements may be two orders of magnitude.
Prior to JDK 5.0 the JCA/JCE framework did not include support classes for
ECC-related
crypto algorithms. Users who wanted to use ECC had to depend on a 3rd
party library
that implemented ECC. However, this did not integrate well with
existing JCA/JCE framework.
Starting in JDK 5.0, full support for ECC classes to facilitate
providers that support ECC
have been included.
Methods that take ByteBuffer arguments have been added to the JCE API
and SPI classes that are used to process bulk data. Providers can
override the engine* methods if they can process ByteBuffers more
efficiently than byte[].
The following JCE methods have been added to support
ByteBuffers:
Prior to JDK 5.0, JCE did not define any parameter class for
specifying the non-default values used in OAEP and PSS padding as
defined in PKCS#1 v2.1 and the RSA-OAEP Key Transport algorithm in the W3C Recommendation for XML
Encryption. Therefore, there was no generic way for applications to
specify non-default values used in OAEP and PSS padding.
In JDK 5.0, new parameter classes have been added to fully support
OAEP padding and the existing PSS parameter class was enhanced with
APIs to fully support RSA PSS signature implementations. Also, SunJCE
provider has been enhanced to accept OAEPParameterSpec
when OAEPPadding is used.
public static final PSSParameterSpec DEFAULT public PSSParameterSpec(String mdName, String mgfName, AlgorithmParameterSpec mgfSpec, int saltLen, int trailerField) public String getDigestAlgorithm() public String getMGFAlgorithm() public AlgorithmParameterSpec getMGFParameters() public int getTrailerField()
In JDK 5.0, javax.crypto.EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo only has one
method, getKeySpec(Cipher) for retrieving the PKCS8EncodedKeySpec
from the encrypted data.
This limitation requires users to specify a cipher which is initialized
with the decryption key and parameters. When users only have the
decryption key, they would have to first retrieve the parameters out of
this EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo object, get hold of matching
Cipher implementation, initialize it, and then call the getKeySpec(Cipher)
method.
To make EncyptedPrivateKeyInfo easier to use and to
make its API consistent with
javax.crypto.SealedObject, the following methods have
been added to
javax.crypto.EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo:
In 1.4.2, the crypto jurisdiction policy files bundled in J2SE limits
the maximum key length (and parameter value for some crypto algorithms)
that can be used for encryption/decryption. Users who desire unlimited
version of crypto jurisdiction files must download them separately.
Also, an exception is thrown when the Cipher instance is
initialized with keys (or parameters for certain crypto algorithms)
exceeds the maximum values allowed by the crypto jurisdiction files.
In JDK 5.0, the Cipher class has been updated to provide
the maximum values for key length and parameters configured in the
jurisdiction policy files, so that applications can use a shorter key
length when the default (limited strength) jurisdiction policy files
are installed.
This section provides a high-level description of the concepts
implemented by the API, and the exact meaning of the technical terms
used in the API specification.
Encryption is the process of taking data (called cleartext)
and a short string (a key), and producing data (ciphertext)
meaningless to a third-party who does not know the key. Decryption is
the inverse process: that of taking ciphertext and a short key string,
and producing cleartext.
Password-Based Encryption (PBE) derives an encryption key from a
password. In order to make the task of getting from password to key
very time-consuming for an attacker, most PBE implementations will mix
in a random number, known as a salt, to create the key.
Encryption and decryption are done using a cipher. A cipher is an
object capable of carrying out encryption and decryption according to
an encryption scheme (algorithm).
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) provides a way to check the
integrity of information transmitted over or stored in an unreliable
medium, based on a secret key. Typically, message authentication codes
are used between two parties that share a secret key in order to
validate information transmitted between these parties.
A MAC mechanism that is based on cryptographic hash functions is
referred to as HMAC. HMAC can be used with any cryptographic hash
function, e.g., MD5 or SHA-1, in combination with a secret shared key.
HMAC is specified in RFC 2104.
The Cipher class provides the functionality of
a cryptographic cipher used for encryption and decryption. It forms the
core of the JCE framework.
Creating a Cipher Object
Like other engine classes in the API, Cipher
objects are created using the getInstance factory methods
of the Cipher class. A factory method is a static method
that returns an instance of a class, in this case, an instance of Cipher,
which implements a requested transformation.
To create a Cipher object, you must specify
the transformation name. You may also specify which provider you want
to supply the implementation of the requested transformation:
public static Cipher getInstance(String transformation);
public static Cipher getInstance(String transformation, String provider);
If just a transformation name is specified, the system
will determine if there is an implementation of the requested
transformation available in the environment, and if there is more than
one, if there is a preferred one.
If both a transformation name and a package provider are
specified, the system will determine if there is an implementation of
the requested transformation in the package requested, and throw an
exception if there is not.
Appendix A of this document contains a
list of standard names that can be used to specify the algorithm name,
mode, and padding scheme components of a transformation.
The objects returned by factory methods are uninitialized,
and must be initialized before they become usable.
A Cipher object obtained via getInstance
must be initialized for one of four modes, which are defined as final
integer constants in the Cipher class. The modes can be
referenced by their symbolic names, which are shown below along with a
description of the purpose of each mode:
ENCRYPT_MODE
Encryption of data.
DECRYPT_MODE
Decryption of data.
WRAP_MODE
Wrapping a Key into bytes so that the key can
be securely transported.
UNWRAP_MODE
Unwrapping of a previously wrapped key into a
java.security.Key object.
Each of the Cipher initialization methods takes a mode
parameter (opmode), and initializes the Cipher object for
that mode. Other parameters include the key (key) or
certificate containing the key (certificate), algorithm
parameters (params), and a source of randomness (random).
To initialize a Cipher object, call one of the following init
methods:
public void init(int opmode, Key key);
public void init(int opmode, Certificate certificate)
public void init(int opmode, Key key, SecureRandom random);
public void init(int opmode, Certificate certificate, SecureRandom random)
public void init(int opmode, Key key, AlgorithmParameterSpec params);
public void init(int opmode, Key key, AlgorithmParameterSpec params, SecureRandom random);
public void init(int opmode, Key key, AlgorithmParameters params)
public void init(int opmode, Key key, AlgorithmParameters params, SecureRandom random)
If a Cipher object that requires parameters (e.g., an
initialization vector) is initialized for encryption, and no parameters
are supplied to the init method, the underlying cipher
implementation is supposed to supply the required parameters itself,
either by generating random parameters or by using a default,
provider-specific set of parameters.
However, if a Cipher object that requires parameters is
initialized for decryption, and no parameters are supplied to the init
method, an InvalidKeyException or InvalidAlgorithmParameterException
exception will be raised, depending on the init method
that has been used.
The same parameters that were used for encryption must be
used for decryption.
Note that when a Cipher object is initialized, it loses
all previously-acquired state. In other words, initializing a Cipher is
equivalent to creating a new instance of that Cipher, and initializing
it. For example, if a Cipher is first initialized for decryption with a
given key, and then initialized for encryption, it will lose any state
acquired while in decryption mode.
Data can be encrypted or decrypted in one step (single-part
operation) or in multiple steps (multiple-part operation). A
multiple-part operation is useful if you do not know in advance how
long the data is going to be, or if the data is too long to be stored
in memory all at once.
To encrypt or decrypt data in a single step, call one of
the doFinal methods:
public byte[] doFinal(byte[] input);
public byte[] doFinal(byte[] input, int inputOffset, int inputLen);
public int doFinal(byte[] input, int inputOffset, int inputLen, byte[] output);
public int doFinal(byte[] input, int inputOffset, int inputLen, byte[] output, int outputOffset)
To encrypt or decrypt data in multiple steps, call one of
the update methods:
public byte[] update(byte[] input);
public byte[] update(byte[] input, int inputOffset, int inputLen);
public int update(byte[] input, int inputOffset, int inputLen, byte[] output);
public int update(byte[] input, int inputOffset, int inputLen, byte[] output, int outputOffset)
A multiple-part operation must be terminated by one of the
above doFinal methods (if there is still some input data
left for the last step), or by one of the following doFinal
methods (if there is no input data left for the last step):
public byte[] doFinal();
public int doFinal(byte[] output, int outputOffset);
All the doFinal methods take care of any
necessary padding (or unpadding), if padding (or unpadding) has been
requested as part of the specified transformation.
A call to doFinal resets the Cipher object
to the state it was in when initialized via a call to init.
That is, the Cipher object is reset and available to encrypt or decrypt
(depending on the operation mode that was specified in the call to init)
more data.
Wrapping a key enables secure transfer of the key from one
place to another.
The wrap/unwrap API makes it more convenient
to write code since it works with key objects directly. These methods
also enable the possibility of secure transfer of hardware-based keys.
To wrap a Key, first initialize the Cipher object
for WRAP_MODE, and then call the following:
public final byte[] wrap(Key key);
If you are supplying the wrapped key bytes (the result of
calling wrap) to someone else who will unwrap them, be
sure to also send additional information the recipient will need in
order to do the unwrap:
the name of the key algorithm, and
the type of the wrapped key (one of Cipher.SECRET_KEY,
Cipher.PRIVATE_KEY, or Cipher.PUBLIC_KEY).
The key algorithm name can be determined by calling the getAlgorithm
method from the Key interface:
public String getAlgorithm();
To unwrap the bytes returned by a previous call to
wrap, first initialize a Cipher object for
UNWRAP_MODE, then call the following:
public final Key unwrap(byte[] wrappedKey, String wrappedKeyAlgorithm, int wrappedKeyType));
Here, wrappedKey is the bytes returned from
the previous call to wrap, wrappedKeyAlgorithm is the
algorithm associated with the wrapped key, and wrappedKeyType
is the type of the wrapped key. This must be one of Cipher.SECRET_KEY,
Cipher.PRIVATE_KEY, or Cipher.PUBLIC_KEY.
The parameters being used by the underlying Cipher
implementation, which were either explicitly passed to the init
method by the application or generated by the underlying implementation
itself, can be retrieved from the Cipher object by calling its getParameters
method, which returns the parameters as a java.security.AlgorithmParameters
object (or null if no parameters are being used). If the
parameter is an initialization vector (IV), it can also be retrieved by
calling the getIV method.
In the following example, a Cipher object implementing
password-based encryption is initialized with just a key and no
parameters. However, the selected algorithm for password-based
encryption requires two parameters - a salt and an iteration
count. Those will be generated by the underlying algorithm
implementation itself. The application can retrieve the generated
parameters from the Cipher object as follows:
// get cipher object for password-based encryption Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("PBEWithMD5AndDES");
// initialize cipher for encryption, without supplying // any parameters. Here, "myKey" is assumed to refer // to an already-generated key. c.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, myKey);
// encrypt some data and store away ciphertext // for later decryption byte[] cipherText = c.doFinal("This is just an example".getBytes());
// get parameter encoding and store it away byte[] encodedAlgParams = algParams.getEncoded();
The same parameters that were used for encryption must be
used for decryption. They can be instantiated from their encoding and
used to initialize the corresponding Cipher object for decryption, as
follows:
// get parameter object for password-based encryption AlgorithmParameters algParams; algParams = AlgorithmParameters.getInstance("PBEWithMD5AndDES");
// initialize with parameter encoding from above algParams.init(encodedAlgParams);
// get cipher object for password-based encryption Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("PBEWithMD5AndDES");
// initialize cipher for decryption, using one of the // init() methods that takes an AlgorithmParameters // object, and pass it the algParams object from above c.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, myKey, algParams);
If you did not specify any parameters when you initialized
a Cipher object, and you are not sure whether or not the underlying
implementation uses any parameters, you can find out by simply calling
the getParameters method of your Cipher object and
checking the value returned. A return value of null
indicates that no parameters were used.
The following cipher algorithms implemented by the SunJCE
provider use parameters:
DES, DES-EDE, and Blowfish, when used in feedback
(i.e., CBC, CFB, OFB, or PCBC) mode, use an initialization vector (IV).
The javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec class can be used
to initialize a Cipher object with a given IV.
PBEWithMD5AndDES uses a set of parameters, comprising a
salt and an iteration count. The javax.crypto.spec.PBEParameterSpec
class can be used to initialize a Cipher object implementing
PBEWithMD5AndDES with a given salt and iteration count.
Note that you do not have to worry about storing or
transferring any algorithm parameters for use by the decryption
operation if you use the SealedObject
class. This class attaches the parameters used for sealing (encryption)
to the encrypted object contents, and uses the same parameters for
unsealing (decryption).
Cipher Output Considerations
Some of the update and doFinal
methods of Cipher allow the caller to specify the output buffer into
which to encrypt or decrypt the data. In these cases, it is important
to pass a buffer that is large enough to hold the result of the
encryption or decryption operation.
The following method in Cipher can be used to determine
how big the output buffer should be:
JCE introduces the concept of secure streams, which combine
an InputStream or OutputStream with a Cipher object. Secure streams are
provided by the CipherInputStream and CipherOutputStream
classes.
This class is a FilterInputStream that
encrypts or decrypts the data passing through it. It is composed of an InputStream,
or one of its subclasses, and a Cipher. CipherInputStream
represents a secure input stream into which a Cipher object has been
interposed. The read methods of CipherInputStream return
data that are read from the underlying InputStream but have
additionally been processed by the embedded Cipher object. The Cipher
object must be fully initialized before being used by a
CipherInputStream.
For example, if the embedded Cipher has been
initialized for decryption, the CipherInputStream will attempt to
decrypt the data it reads from the underlying InputStream before
returning them to the application.
This class adheres strictly to the semantics,
especially the failure semantics, of its ancestor classes java.io.FilterInputStream
and java.io.InputStream. This class has exactly those
methods specified in its ancestor classes, and overrides them all, so
that the data are additonally processed by the embedded cipher.
Moreover, this class catches all exceptions that are not thrown by its
ancestor classes. In particular, the skip(long) method
skips only data that has been processed by the Cipher.
It is crucial for a programmer using this class not
to use methods that are not defined or overridden in this class (such
as a new method or constructor that is later added to one of the super
classes), because the design and implementation of those methods are
unlikely to have considered security impact with regard to
CipherInputStream.
As an example of its usage, suppose cipher1
has been initialized for encryption. The code below demonstrates how to
use a CipherInputStream containing that cipher and a FileInputStream in
order to encrypt input stream data:
fis = new FileInputStream("/tmp/a.txt"); cis = new CipherInputStream(fis, cipher1); fos = new FileOutputStream("/tmp/b.txt"); byte[] b = new byte[8]; int i = cis.read(b); while (i != -1) { fos.write(b, 0, i); i = cis.read(b); }
The above program reads and encrypts the content
from the file /tmp/a.txt and then stores the result (the
encrypted bytes) in /tmp/b.txt.
The following example demonstrates how to easily
connect several instances of CipherInputStream and FileInputStream. In
this example, assume that cipher1 and cipher2
have been initialized for encryption and decryption (with corresponding
keys), respectively.
fis = new FileInputStream("/tmp/a.txt"); cis1 = new CipherInputStream(fis, cipher1); cis2 = new CipherInputStream(cis1, cipher2); fos = new FileOutputStream("/tmp/b.txt"); byte[] b = new byte[8]; int i = cis2.read(b); while (i != -1) { fos.write(b, 0, i); i = cis2.read(b); }
The above program copies the content from file /tmp/a.txt
to /tmp/b.txt, except that the content is first encrypted
and then decrypted back when it is read from /tmp/a.txt.
Of course since this program simply encrypts text and decrypts it back
right away, it's actually not very useful except as a simple way of
illustrating chaining of CipherInputStreams.
This class is a FilterOutputStream
that encrypts or decrypts the data passing through it. It is composed
of an OutputStream, or one of its subclasses, and a Cipher.
CipherOutputStream represents a secure output stream into which a
Cipher object has been interposed. The write methods of
CipherOutputStream first process the data with the embedded Cipher
object before writing them out to the underlying OutputStream. The
Cipher object must be fully initialized before being used by a
CipherOutputStream.
For example, if the embedded Cipher has been
initialized for encryption, the CipherOutputStream will encrypt its
data, before writing them out to the underlying output stream.
This class adheres strictly to the semantics,
especially the failure semantics, of its ancestor classes java.io.OutputStream
and java.io.FilterOutputStream. This class has exactly
those methods specified in its ancestor classes, and overrides them
all, so that all data are additionally processed by the embedded
cipher. Moreover, this class catches all exceptions that are not thrown
by its ancestor classes.
It is crucial for a programmer using this class not
to use methods that are not defined or overridden in this class (such
as a new method or constructor that is later added to one of the super
classes), because the design and implementation of those methods are
unlikely to have considered security impact with regard to
CipherOutputStream.
As an example of its usage, suppose cipher1
has been initialized for encryption. The code below demonstrates how to
use a CipherOutputStream containing that cipher and a FileOutputStream
in order to encrypt data to be written to an output stream:
fis = new FileInputStream("/tmp/a.txt"); fos = new FileOutputStream("/tmp/b.txt"); cos = new CipherOutputStream(fos, cipher1); byte[] b = new byte[8]; int i = fis.read(b); while (i != -1) { cos.write(b, 0, i); i = fis.read(b); } cos.flush();
The above program reads the content from the file /tmp/a.txt,
then encrypts and stores the result (the encrypted bytes) in /tmp/b.txt.
The following example demonstrates how to easily
connect several instances of CipherOutputStream and FileOutputStream.
In this example, assume that cipher1 and cipher2
have been initialized for decryption and encryption (with corresponding
keys), respectively:
fis = new FileInputStream("/tmp/a.txt"); fos = new FileOutputStream("/tmp/b.txt"); cos1 = new CipherOutputStream(fos, cipher1); cos2 = new CipherOutputStream(cos1, cipher2); byte[] b = new byte[8]; int i = fis.read(b); while (i != -1) { cos2.write(b, 0, i); i = fis.read(b); } cos2.flush();
The above program copies the content from file /tmp/a.txt
to /tmp/b.txt, except that the content is first encrypted
and then decrypted back before it is written to /tmp/b.txt.
There is one important difference between the flush
and close methods of this class, which becomes even more
relevant if the encapsulated Cipher object implements a block cipher
algorithm with padding turned on:
flush flushes the underlying
OutputStream by forcing any buffered output bytes that have already
been processed by the encapsulated Cipher object to be written out. Any
bytes buffered by the encapsulated Cipher object and waiting to be
processed by it will not be written out.
close closes the underlying
OutputStream and releases any system resources associated with it. It
invokes the doFinal method of the encapsulated Cipher
object, causing any bytes buffered by it to be processed and written
out to the underlying stream by calling its flush method.
A key generator is used to generate secret keys for
symmetric algorithms.
Creating a Key Generator
Like other engine classes in the API, KeyGenerator objects
are created using the getInstance factory methods of the
KeyGenerator class. A factory method is a static method that returns an
instance of a class, in this case, an instance of KeyGenerator
which provides an implementation of the requested key generator.
getInstance takes as its argument the name of
a symmetric algorithm for which a secret key is to be generated.
Optionally, a package provider name may be specified:
public static KeyGenerator getInstance(String algorithm);
public static KeyGenerator getInstance(String algorithm, String provider);
If just an algorithm name is specified, the system will
determine if there is an implementation of the requested key generator
available in the environment, and if there is more than one, if there
is a preferred one.
If both an algorithm name and a package provider are
specified, the system will determine if there is an implementation of
the requested key generator in the package requested, and throw an
exception if there is not.
Initializing a KeyGenerator Object
A key generator for a particular symmetric-key algorithm
creates a symmetric key that can be used with that algorithm. It also
associates algorithm-specific parameters (if any) with the generated
key.
There are two ways to generate a key: in an
algorithm-independent manner, and in an algorithm-specific manner. The
only difference between the two is the initialization of the object:
Algorithm-Independent Initialization
All key generators share the concepts of a keysize
and a source of randomness. There is an init
method that takes these two universally shared types of arguments.
There is also one that takes just a keysize argument, and
uses a system-provided source of randomness, and one that takes just a
source of randomness:
public void init(SecureRandom random);
public void init(int keysize);
public void init(int keysize, SecureRandom random);
Since no other parameters are specified when you call
the above algorithm-independent init methods, it is up to
the provider what to do about the algorithm-specific parameters (if
any) to be associated with the generated key.
Algorithm-Specific Initialization
For situations where a set of algorithm-specific
parameters already exists, there are two init methods
that have an AlgorithmParameterSpec argument. One also
has a SecureRandom argument, while the source of
randomness is system-provided for the other:
public void init(AlgorithmParameterSpec params);
public void init(AlgorithmParameterSpec params, SecureRandom random);
In case the client does not explicitly initialize the
KeyGenerator (via a call to an init method), each
provider must supply (and document) a default initialization.
Key factories are used to convert keys (opaque
cryptographic keys of type java.security.Key) into key
specifications (transparent representations of the underlying key
material in a suitable format), and vice versa.
A javax.crypto.SecretKeyFactory object
operates only on secret (symmetric) keys, whereas a java.security.KeyFactory
object processes the public and private key components of a key pair.
Objects of type java.security.Key, of which java.security.PublicKey,
java.security.PrivateKey, and javax.crypto.SecretKey
are subclasses, are opaque key objects, because you cannot tell how
they are implemented. The underlying implementation is
provider-dependent, and may be software or hardware based. Key
factories allow providers to supply their own implementations of
cryptographic keys.
For example, if you have a key specification for a Diffie
Hellman public key, consisting of the public value y, the
prime modulus p, and the base g, and you
feed the same specification to Diffie-Hellman key factories from
different providers, the resulting PublicKey objects will
most likely have different underlying implementations.
A provider should document the key specifications supported
by its secret key factory. For example, the SecretKeyFactory
for DES keys supplied by the "SunJCE" provider supports DESKeySpec
as a transparent representation of DES keys, the SecretKeyFactory
for DES-EDE keys supports DESedeKeySpec as a transparent
representation of DES-EDE keys, and the SecretKeyFactory
for PBE supports PBEKeySpec as a transparent
representation of the underlying password.
The following is an example of how to use a SecretKeyFactory
to convert secret key data into a SecretKey object, which
can be used for a subsequent Cipher operation:
// Note the following bytes are not realistic secret key data // bytes but are simply supplied as an illustration of using data // bytes (key material) you already have to build a DESKeySpec. byte[] desKeyData = { (byte)0x01, (byte)0x02, (byte)0x03, (byte)0x04, (byte)0x05, (byte)0x06, (byte)0x07, (byte)0x08 }; DESKeySpec desKeySpec = new DESKeySpec(desKeyData); SecretKeyFactory keyFactory = SecretKeyFactory.getInstance("DES"); SecretKey secretKey = keyFactory.generateSecret(desKeySpec);
In this case, the underlying implementation of secretKey
is based on the provider of keyFactory.
An alternative, provider-independent way of creating a
functionally equivalent SecretKey object from the same
key material is to use the javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec
class, which implements the javax.crypto.SecretKey
interface:
This class enables a programmer to create an object and
protect its confidentiality with a cryptographic algorithm.
Given any object that implements the java.io.Serializable
interface, one can create a SealedObject that
encapsulates the original object, in serialized format (i.e., a "deep
copy"), and seals (encrypts) its serialized contents, using a
cryptographic algorithm such as DES, to protect its confidentiality.
The encrypted content can later be decrypted (with the corresponding
algorithm using the correct decryption key) and de-serialized, yielding
the original object.
A typical usage is illustrated in the following code
segment: In order to seal an object, you create a SealedObject
from the object to be sealed and a fully initialized Cipher
object that will encrypt the serialized object contents. In this
example, the String "This is a secret" is sealed using the DES
algorithm. Note that any algorithm parameters that may be used in the
sealing operation are stored inside of SealedObject:
// create Cipher object // Note: sKey is assumed to refer to an already-generated // secret DES key. Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("DES"); c.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, sKey);
// do the sealing SealedObject so = new SealedObject("This is a secret", c);
The original object that was sealed can be recovered in two
different ways:
by using a Cipher object that has been
initialized with the exact same algorithm, key, padding scheme, etc.,
that were used to seal the object:
c.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, sKey); try { String s = (String)so.getObject(c); } catch (Exception e) { // do something };
This approach has the advantage that the party who
unseals the sealed object does not require knowledge of the decryption
key. For example, after one party has initialized the cipher object
with the required decryption key, it could hand over the cipher object
to another party who then unseals the sealed object.
by using the appropriate decryption key (since DES is a
symmetric encryption algorithm, we use the same key for sealing and
unsealing):
try { String s = (String)so.getObject(sKey); } catch (Exception e) { // do something };
In this approach, the getObject method
creates a cipher object for the appropriate decryption algorithm and
initializes it with the given decryption key and the algorithm
parameters (if any) that were stored in the sealed object. This
approach has the advantage that the party who unseals the object does
not need to keep track of the parameters (e.g., the IV) that were used
to seal the object.
The KeyAgreement class provides the functionality of a key
agreement protocol. The keys involved in establishing a shared secret
are created by one of the key generators (KeyPairGenerator
or KeyGenerator), a KeyFactory, or as a
result from an intermediate phase of the key agreement protocol.
Creating a KeyAgreement Object
Each party involved in the key agreement has to create a
KeyAgreement object. Like other engine classes in the API, KeyAgreement
objects are created using the getInstance factory methods
of the KeyAgreement class. A factory method is a static method that
returns an instance of a class, in this case, an instance of KeyAgreement
which provides the requested key agreement algorithm.
getInstance takes as its argument the name of
a key agreement algorithm. Optionally, a package provider name may be
specified:
public static KeyAgreement getInstance(String algorithm);
public static KeyAgreement getInstance(String algorithm, String provider);
If just an algorithm name is specified, the system will
determine if there is an implementation of the requested key agreement
available in the environment, and if there is more than one, if there
is a preferred one.
If both an algorithm name and a package provider are
specified, the system will determine if there is an implementation of
the requested key agreement in the package requested, and throw an
exception if there is not.
Initializing a KeyAgreement Object
You initialize a KeyAgreement object with your private
information. In the case of Diffie-Hellman, you initialize it with your
Diffie-Hellman private key. Additional initialization information may
contain a source of randomness and/or a set of algorithm parameters.
Note that if the requested key agreement algorithm requires the
specification of algorithm parameters, and only a key, but no
parameters are provided to initialize the KeyAgreement object, the key
must contain the required algorithm parameters. (For example, the
Diffie-Hellman algorithm uses a prime modulus p and a
base generator g as its parameters.)
To initialize a KeyAgreement object, call one of its init
methods:
public void init(Key key);
public void init(Key key, SecureRandom random);
public void init(Key key, AlgorithmParameterSpec params);
public void init(Key key, AlgorithmParameterSpec params, SecureRandom random);
Executing a KeyAgreement Phase
Every key agreement protocol consists of a number of
phases that need to be executed by each party involved in the key
agreement.
To execute the next phase in the key agreement, call the doPhase
method:
public Key doPhase(Key key, boolean lastPhase);
The key parameter contains the key to be
processed by that phase. In most cases, this is the public key of one
of the other parties involved in the key agreement, or an intermediate
key that was generated by a previous phase. doPhase may
return an intermediate key that you may have to send to the other
parties of this key agreement, so they can process it in a subsequent
phase.
The lastPhase parameter specifies whether or
not the phase to be executed is the last one in the key agreeement: A
value of FALSE indicates that this is not the last phase
of the key agreement (there are more phases to follow), and a value of TRUE
indicates that this is the last phase of the key agreement and the key
agreement is completed, i.e., generateSecret can be
called next.
In the example of Diffie-Hellman between two parties (see Appendix F), you call doPhase once,
with lastPhase set to TRUE. In the example
of Diffie-Hellman between three parties, you call doPhase
twice: the first time with lastPhase set to FALSE,
the 2nd time with lastPhase set to TRUE.
Generating the Shared Secret
After each party has executed all the required key
agreement phases, it can compute the shared secret by calling one of
the generateSecret methods:
public byte[] generateSecret();
public int generateSecret(byte[] sharedSecret, int offset);
public SecretKey generateSecret(String algorithm);
The Mac class provides the functionality of a Message
Authentication Code (MAC). Please refer to the code
example in Appendix F.
Creating a Mac Object
Like other engine classes in the API, Mac objects are
created using the getInstance factory methods of the Mac
class. A factory method is a static method that returns an instance of
a class, in this case, an instance of Mac which provides
the requested MAC algorithm.
getInstance takes as its argument the name of
a MAC algorithm. Optionally, a package provider name may be specified:
public static Mac getInstance(String algorithm);
public static Mac getInstance(String algorithm, String provider);
If just an algorithm name is specified, the system will
determine if there is an implementation of the requested MAC algorithm
available in the environment, and if there is more than one, if there
is a preferred one.
If both an algorithm name and a package provider are
specified, the system will determine if there is an implementation of
the requested MAC algorithm in the package requested, and throw an
exception if there is not.
Initializing a Mac Object
A Mac object is always initialized with a (secret) key and
may optionally be initialized with a set of parameters, depending on
the underlying MAC algorithm.
To initialize a Mac object, call one of its init
methods:
public void init(Key key);
public void init(Key key, AlgorithmParameterSpec params);
You can initialize your Mac object with any (secret-)key
object that implements the javax.crypto.SecretKey
interface. This could be an object returned by javax.crypto.KeyGenerator.generateKey(),
or one that is the result of a key agreement protocol, as returned by javax.crypto.KeyAgreement.generateSecret(),
or an instance of javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec.
With some MAC algorithms, the (secret-)key algorithm
associated with the (secret-)key object used to initialize the Mac
object does not matter (this is the case with the HMAC-MD5 and
HMAC-SHA1 implementations of the SunJCE provider). With others,
however, the (secret-)key algorithm does matter, and an InvalidKeyException
is thrown if a (secret-)key object with an inappropriate (secret-)key
algorithm is used.
Computing a MAC
A MAC can be computed in one step (single-part operation)
or in multiple steps (multiple-part operation). A multiple-part
operation is useful if you do not know in advance how long the data is
going to be, or if the data is too long to be stored in memory all at
once.
To compute the MAC of some data in a single step, call the
following doFinal method:
public byte[] doFinal(byte[] input);
To compute the MAC of some data in multiple steps, call
one of the update methods:
public void update(byte input);
public void update(byte[] input);
public void update(byte[] input, int inputOffset, int inputLen);
A multiple-part operation must be terminated by the above doFinal
method (if there is still some input data left for the last step), or
by one of the following doFinal methods (if there is no
input data left for the last step):
public byte[] doFinal();
public void doFinal(byte[] output, int outOffset);
[Note 1: This section should be
ignored by most application developers. It is only for people whose
applications may be exported to those few countries whose governments
mandate cryptographic restrictions, if it desired that such
applications have fewer cryptographic restrictions than those mandated.
If you want to skip this section, you can go on to Installing JCE Providers for JDK 5.0.]
[Note 2: Throughout this section,
the term "application" is meant to encompass both applications and
applets.]
The JCE framework within JDK 5.0 includes an ability
to enforce restrictions regarding the cryptographic algorithms and
maximum cryptographic strengths available to applets/applications in
different jurisdiction contexts (locations). Any such restrictions are
specified in "jurisdiction policy files".
Due to import control restrictions by the governments of a few
countries, the jurisdiction policy files shipped with the JDK 5.0
from Sun Microsystems specify that "strong" but limited
cryptography may be used. An "unlimited strength" version of these
files indicating no restrictions on cryptographic strengths is
available for those living in eligible countries (which is most
countries). But only the "strong" version can be imported into those
countries whose governments mandate restrictions. The JCE framework
will enforce the restrictions specified in the installed jurisdiction
policy files.
It is possible that the governments of some or all such countries
may allow certain applications to become exempt from some or all
cryptographic restrictions. For example, they may consider certain
types of applications as "special" and thus exempt. Or they may exempt
any application that utilizes an "exemption mechanism," such as key
recovery. Applications deemed to be exempt could get access to stronger
cryptography than that allowed for non-exempt applications in such
countries.
In order for an application to be recognized as "exempt" at
runtime, it must meet the following conditions:
It must have a permission policy file bundled with it in a JAR
file. The permission policy file specifies what cryptography-related
permissions the application has, and under what conditions (if any).
The JAR file containing the application and the permission
policy file must have been signed using a code-signing certificate
issued after the application was accepted as exempt.
Below are sample steps required in order to make an application
exempt from some or all cryptographic restrictions. This is a basic
outline that includes information about what is required by JCE in
order to recognize and treat applications as being exempt. You will
need to know the exemption requirements of the particular country or
countries in which you would like your application to be able to be run
but whose governments require cryptographic restrictions. You will also
need to know the requirements of a JCE framework vendor that has a
process in place for handling exempt applications. Consult such a
vendor for further information. (Note: The SunJCE provider does not
supply an implementation of the ExemptionMechanismSpi class.)
Step 3a: Apply for Government Approval From the
Government Mandating Restrictions.
Step 3b: Get a Code-Signing Certificate
Step 3c: Bundle the Application and Permission Policy File
into a JAR file
Step 3d: Sign the JAR file
Step 3e: Set Up Your Environment Like That of a User in a
Restricted Country
Step 3f: (only for apps using exemption mechanisms) Install
a Provider Implementing the Exemption Mechanism Specified in the
Permission Policy File
Step 4: Test Your Application
Step 5: Apply for U.S. Government Export Approval If Required
Step 6: Deploy Your Application
Special Code Requirements for Applications that Use Exemption
Mechanisms
When an application has a permission policy file associated with
it (in the same JAR file) and that permission policy file specifies an
exemption mechanism, then when the Cipher getInstance
method is called to instantiate a Cipher, the JCE code searches the
installed providers for one that implements the specified exemption
mechanism. If it finds such a provider, JCE instantiates an
ExemptionMechanism API object associated with the provider's
implementation, and then associates the ExemptionMechanism object with
the Cipher returned by getInstance.
After instantiating a Cipher, and prior to initializing it (via
a call to the Cipher init method), your code must call
the following Cipher method:
public ExemptionMechanism getExemptionMechanism()
This call returns the ExemptionMechanism object associated with
the Cipher. You must then initialize the exemption mechanism
implementation by calling the following method on the returned
ExemptionMechanism:
public final void init(Key key)
The argument you supply should be the same as the argument of
the same types that you will subsequently supply to a Cipher init
method.
Once you have initialized the ExemptionMechanism, you can
proceed as usual to initialize and use the Cipher.
Permission Policy Files
In order for an application to be recognized at runtime as being
"exempt" from some or all cryptographic restrictions, it must have a
permission policy file bundled with it in a JAR file. The permission
policy file specifies what cryptography-related permissions the
application has, and under what conditions (if any).
Note: The permission policy file bundled
with an application must be named cryptoPerms.
The format of a permission entry in a permission policy file
that accompanies an exempt application is the same as the format for a
jurisdiction policy file downloaded with the JDK 5.0, which
is:
permission <crypto permission class name>[ <alg_name> [[, <exemption mechanism name>][, <maxKeySize> [, <AlgorithmParameterSpec class name>, <parameters for constructing an AlgorithmParameterSpec object>]]]];
See Appendix D for more information about
the jurisdiction policy file format.
Permission Policy Files for Exempt Applications
Some applications may be allowed to be completely
unrestricted. Thus, the permission policy file that accompanies such an
application usually just needs to contain the following:
grant { // There are no restrictions to any algorithms. permission javax.crypto.CryptoAllPermission; };
If an application just uses a single algorithm (or several
specific algorithms), then the permission policy file could simply
mention that algorithm (or algorithms) explicitly, rather than granting
CryptoAllPermission. For example, if an application just uses the
Blowfish algorithm, the permission policy file doesn't have to grant
CryptoAllPermission to all algorithms. It could just specify that there
is no cryptographic restriction if the Blowfish algorithm is used. In
order to do this, the permission policy file would look like the
following:
grant { permission javax.crypto.CryptoPermission "Blowfish"; };
Permission Policy Files for Applications Exempt Due to
Exemption Mechanisms
If an application is considered "exempt" if an exemption
mechanism is enforced, then the permission policy file that accompanies
the application must specify one or more exemption mechanisms. At
runtime, the application will be considered exempt if any of those
exemption mechanisms is enforced. Each exemption mechanism must be
specified in a permission entry that looks like the following:
// No algorithm restrictions if specified // exemption mechanism is enforced. permission javax.crypto.CryptoPermission *, "<ExemptionMechanismName>";
where <ExemptionMechanismName> specifies
the name of an exemption mechanism. The list of possible exemption
mechanism names includes:
KeyRecovery
KeyEscrow
KeyWeakening
As an example, suppose your application is exempt if either key
recovery or key escrow is enforced. Then your permission policy file
should contain the following:
grant { // No algorithm restrictions if KeyRecovery is enforced. permission javax.crypto.CryptoPermission *, "KeyRecovery"; // No algorithm restrictions if KeyEscrow is enforced. permission javax.crypto.CryptoPermission *, "KeyEscrow"; };
Note: Permission entries that specify exemption mechanisms
should not also specify maximum key sizes. The allowed key
sizes are actually determined from the installed exempt jurisdiction
policy files, as described in the next section.
How Bundled Permission Policy Files Affect Cryptographic
Permissions
At runtime, when an application instantiates a Cipher (via a
call to its getInstance method) and that application has
an associated permission policy file, JCE checks to see whether the
permission policy file has an entry that applies to the algorithm
specified in the getInstance call. If it does, and the
entry grants CryptoAllPermission or does not specify that an exemption
mechanism must be enforced, it means there is no cryptographic
restriction for this particular algorithm.
If the permission policy file has an entry that applies to the
algorithm specified in the getInstance call and the entry
does specify that an exemption mechanism must be enforced,
then the exempt jurisdiction policy file(s) are examined. If the exempt
permissions include an entry for the relevant algorithm and exemption
mechanism, and that entry is implied by the permissions in the
permission policy file bundled with the application, and if there is an
implementation of the specified exemption mechanism available from one
of the registered providers, then the maximum key size and algorithm
parameter values for the Cipher are determined from the exempt
permission entry.
If there is no exempt permission entry implied by the relevant
entry in the permission policy file bundled with the application, or if
there is no implementation of the specified exemption mechanism
available from any of the registered providers, then the application is
only allowed the standard default cryptographic permissions.
In order to be used, a cryptographic provider must be installed
and registered, either statically or dynamically. Cryptographic
providers for JCE in JDK 5.0 are installed and configured
the same way as all other providers for the JavaTM
2 platform. More information about installing and configuring providers
can be found in the Installing
Providers section of the JavaTM
Cryptography Architecture API Specification & Reference
document.
You do not need to register the "SunJCE" provider because it is
pre-registered. If you want to use other providers, read the following
sections to see how to register them.
The first thing you must do is make the provider classes
available so that they can be found when requested. Provider classes
are shipped as a signed JAR (Java ARchive) file.
There are two possible ways to install the provider classes:
Install the JAR file containing the provider classes as an
"installed" or "bundled" extension.
Place the JAR file containing the provider classes in your
class path.
The provider JAR file will be considered an installed
extension if it is placed in the standard place for the JAR files of an
installed extension:
Here <java-home> refers to the directory where
the runtime software is installed, which is the top-level directory of
the JavaTM 2 Runtime Environment
(JRE) or the jre directory in the JavaTM
2 SDK (Java 2 SDK) software. For example, if you have JDK 5.0 installed on Solaris in a directory named /home/user1/JDK1.5.0, or on Microsoft Windows in a directory named C:\Java
DK1.5.0, then you need to install the JAR file in the
following directory:
Similarly, if you have the JRE 5.0 installed on Solaris in a
directory named /home/user1/jre1.5.0, or on Microsoft
Windows in a directory named C:\jre1.5.0, you need to
install the JAR file in the following directory:
Here <java-home> refers to the directory where
the JRE was installed. For example, if you have JDK 5.0
installed on Solaris in a directory named /home/user1/JDK1.5.0, or on Microsoft Windows in a directory named C:\JDK1.5.0, then you need to edit the following file:
Similarly, if you have the Java 2 Runtime Environment, v 1.4
installed on Solaris in a directory named /home/user1/jre1.5.0,
or on Microsoft Windows in a directory named C:\jre1.5.0,
then you need to edit this file:
For each provider, this file should have a statement of the
following form:
security.provider.n=masterClassName
This declares a provider, and specifies its preference order n.
The preference order is the order in which providers are searched for
requested algorithms when no specific provider is requested. The order
is 1-based; 1 is the most preferred, followed by 2, and so on.
masterClassName must specify the fully qualified name of
the provider's "master class". The provider vendor should supply you
this name.
JDK 5.0 comes standard with a provider named
"SUN", which is automatically configured as a static provider in the java.security
properties file, as follows:
security.provider.1=sun.security.provider.Sun
(The "SUN" provider's master class is the Sun
class in the sun.security.provider package.)
The JCE provider "SunJCE" and other security-related providers
shipped with the Java 2 platform are also automatically configured as
static providers.
To utilize another JCE provider, add a line registering the
alternate provider, giving it whatever preference order you prefer (and
making corresponding adjustments to the other providers' orders, if
needed).
Suppose that the master class of a provider you want to register
is the CryptoX class in the com.cryptox.provider
package, and that you would like to make this provider the second
preferred provider. To do so, add the following line to the java.security
file below the line for the "SUN" provider, and increment the
preference order numbers for all other providers whose numbers were
greater than or equal to 2 before your addition:
security.provider.2=com.cryptox.provider.CryptoX
Note: Providers may also be registered dynamically. To do so, a program
can call either the addProvider or insertProviderAt
method in the Security class. This type of registration
is not persistent and can only be done by code which is granted the
following permission:
where {name} is replaced by the actual provider name. For
example, if the provider name is "MyJCE" and if your code that
dynamically registers this provider is in the MyApp.jar
file in the /localWork directory, then here is a sample
policy file grant statement granting that permission:
grant codeBase "file:/localWork/MyApp.jar" { permission java.security.SecurityPermission "insertProvider.MyJCE"; };
Whenever JCE providers are not installed extensions, permissions
must be granted for when applets or applications using JCE are run
while a security manager is installed. There is typically a security
manager installed whenever an applet is running, and a security manager
may be installed for an application either via code in the application
itself or via a command-line argument. Permissions do not need to be
granted to installed extensions, since the default system policy
configuration file grants all permissions to installed extensions.
The documentation from the vendor of each provider you will be
using should include information as to which permissions it requires,
and how to grant such permissions. For example, the following
permissions may be needed by a provider if it is not an installed
extension and a security manager is installed:
java.lang.RuntimePermission to get class
protection domains. The provider may need to get its own protection
domain in the process of doing self-integrity checking.
java.security.SecurityPermission
"putProviderProperty.{name}" to set provider properties, where {name}
is replaced by the actual provider name.
For example, a sample statement granting permissions to a
provider whose name is "MyJCE" and whose code is in myjce_provider.jar
appears below. Such a statement could appear in a policy file. In this
example, the myjce_provider.jar file is assumed to be in
the /localWork directory.
The "SunJCE" provider supplies its own implementation of the java.security.KeyStore
class in the JDK 5.0. Its implementation employs a much
stronger protection of private keys (using password-based encryption
with Triple DES) than the keystore implementation supplied by the "SUN"
provider in the JDK 5.0 (Note that because the JDK 5.0 is distributed world-wide in binary and source format, it cannot
employ any strong encryption mechanisms.)
In order to take advantage of the keystore implementation of the
"SunJCE" provider, you specify "JCEKS" as the keystore type.
You may upgrade your keystore of type "JKS" - this is the
name of the keystore type implemented by the "SUN" provider in the Java
2 SDK - to a JCE keystore of type "JCEKS" by changing the
password of a private-key entry in your keystore.
To apply the cryptographically strong(er) key protection supplied
by "SunJCE" to a private key named "signkey" in your default keystore,
use the following command, which will prompt you for the old and new
key passwords:
This section is a short tutorial on how to use some of the major
features of the JCE APIs in the JDK 5.0 Complete sample
programs that exercise the APIs can be found in Appendix
F of this document.
This section takes the user through the process of generating a
key, creating and initializing a cipher object, encrypting a file, and
then decrypting it. Throughout this example, we use the Data Encryption
Standard (DES).
Generating a Key
To create a DES key, we have to instantiate a KeyGenerator for
DES. We do not specify a provider, because we do not care about a
particular DES key generation implementation. Since we do not
initialize the KeyGenerator, a system-provided source of randomness
will be used to create the DES key:
After the key has been generated, the same KeyGenerator object
can be re-used to create further keys.
Creating a Cipher
The next step is to create a Cipher instance. To do this, we
use one of the getInstance factory methods of the Cipher
class. We must specify the name of the requested transformation, which
includes the following components, separated by slashes (/):
the algorithm name
the mode (optional)
the padding scheme (optional)
In this example, we create a DES (Data Encryption Standard)
cipher in Electronic Codebook mode, with PKCS #5-style padding. We do
not specify a provider, because we do not care about a particular
implementation of the requested transformation.
The standard algorithm name for DES is "DES", the standard
name for the Electronic Codebook mode is "ECB", and the standard name
for PKCS #5-style padding is "PKCS5Padding":
Cipher desCipher;
// Create the cipher desCipher = Cipher.getInstance("DES/ECB/PKCS5Padding");
We use the generated desKey from above to
initialize the Cipher object for encryption:
// Initialize the cipher for encryption desCipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, desKey);
// Our cleartext byte[] cleartext = "This is just an example".getBytes();
// Encrypt the cleartext byte[] ciphertext = desCipher.doFinal(cleartext);
// Initialize the same cipher for decryption desCipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, desKey);
// Decrypt the ciphertext byte[] cleartext1 = desCipher.doFinal(ciphertext);
In this example, we prompt the user for a password from which we
derive an encryption key.
It would seem logical to collect and store the password in an
object of type java.lang.String. However, here's the
caveat: Objects of type String are immutable, i.e., there
are no methods defined that allow you to change (overwrite) or zero out
the contents of a String after usage. This feature makes String
objects unsuitable for storing security sensitive information such as
user passwords. You should always collect and store security sensitive
information in a char array instead.
For that reason, the javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec
class takes (and returns) a password as a char array.
The following method is an example of how to collect a user
password as a char array:
/** * Reads user password from given input stream. */ public char[] readPasswd(InputStream in) throws IOException { char[] lineBuffer; char[] buf; int i;
buf = lineBuffer = new char[128];
int room = buf.length; int offset = 0; int c;
loop: while (true) { switch (c = in.read()) { case -1: case '\n': break loop;
case '\r': int c2 = in.read(); if ((c2 != '\n') && (c2 != -1)) { if (!(in instanceof PushbackInputStream)) { in = new PushbackInputStream(in); } ((PushbackInputStream)in).unread(c2); } else break loop;
char[] ret = new char[offset]; System.arraycopy(buf, 0, ret, 0, offset); Arrays.fill(buf, ' ');
return ret; }
In order to use Password-Based Encryption (PBE) as defined in
PKCS #5, we have to specify a salt and an iteration count.
The same salt and iteration count that are used for encryption must be
used for decryption:
// Salt byte[] salt = { (byte)0xc7, (byte)0x73, (byte)0x21, (byte)0x8c, (byte)0x7e, (byte)0xc8, (byte)0xee, (byte)0x99 };
// Iteration count int count = 20;
// Create PBE parameter set pbeParamSpec = new PBEParameterSpec(salt, count);
// Prompt user for encryption password. // Collect user password as char array (using the // "readPasswd" method from above), and convert // it into a SecretKey object, using a PBE key // factory. System.out.print("Enter encryption password: "); System.out.flush(); pbeKeySpec = new PBEKeySpec(readPasswd(System.in)); keyFac = SecretKeyFactory.getInstance("PBEWithMD5AndDES"); SecretKey pbeKey = keyFac.generateSecret(pbeKeySpec);
The JCE API requires and utilizes a set of standard names for
algorithms, algorithm modes, and padding schemes. This specification
establishes the following names as standard names. It supplements the
list of standard names defined in Appendix
A in the JavaTM Cryptography
Architecture API Specification & Reference. Note that algorithm
names are treated case-insensitively.
In some cases naming conventions are suggested for forming names
that are not explicitly listed, to facilitate name consistency across
provider implementations. Such suggestions use items in angle brackets
(such as <digest> and <encryption>) as placeholders to be
replaced by specific message digest, encryption algorithm, and other
names.
Cipher
Algorithm
The following names can be specified as the algorithm
component in a transformation when requesting an
instance of Cipher:
AES: Advanced Encryption Standard as specified by
NIST in a draft FIPS. Based on the Rijndael algorithm by Joan Daemen
and Vincent Rijmen, AES is a 128-bit block cipher supporting keys of
128, 192, and 256 bits.
ARCFOUR/RC4: A stream cipher developed by Ron
Rivest. For more information, see K. Kaukonen and R. Thayer, "A Stream
Cipher Encryption Algorithm 'Arcfour'", Internet Draft (expired),
draft-kaukonen-cipher-arcfour-03.txt.
Blowfish: The block cipher designed by Bruce
Schneier.
DES: The Digital Encryption Standard as described in
FIPS PUB 46-2.
PBEWith<digest>And<encryption> or PBEWith<prf>And<encryption>:
The password-based encryption algorithm (PKCS #5), using the specified
message digest (<digest>) or pseudo-random function (<prf>)
and encryption algorithm (<encryption>). Examples:
PBEWithMD5AndDES: The password-based encryption
algorithm as defined in: RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #5: Password-Based
Encryption Standard," version 1.5, Nov 1993. Note that this algorithm
implies CBC as the cipher mode and PKCS5Padding as the padding scheme and
cannot be used with any other cipher modes or padding schemes.
PBEWithHmacSHA1AndDESede: The password-based
encryption algorithm as defined in: RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #5:
Password-Based Cryptography Standard," version 2.0, March 1999.
RC2, RC4, and RC5: Variable-key-size
encryption algorithms developed by Ron Rivest for RSA Data Security,
Inc.
RSA: The RSA encryption algorithm as defined in PKCS
#1.
Mode
The following names can be specified as the mode
component in a transformation when requesting an
instance of Cipher:
NONE: No mode.
CBC: Cipher Block Chaining
Mode, as defined in FIPS PUB 81.
CFB: Cipher Feedback Mode, as defined in FIPS PUB
81.
ECB: Electronic Codebook Mode, as defined in: The
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) PUB 81, "DES Modes of
Operation," U.S. Department of Commerce, Dec 1980.
OFB: Output Feedback Mode, as defined in FIPS PUB
81.
PCBC: Propagating Cipher Block Chaining, as defined
by Kerberos V4.
Padding
The following names can be specified as the padding
component in a transformation when requesting an
instance of Cipher:
ISO10126Padding. This padding for block ciphers is
described in 5.2
Block Encryption Algorithms in the W3C's "XML Encryption Syntax and
Processing" document.
NoPadding: No padding.
OAEPWith<digest>And<mgf>Padding: Optimal
Asymmetric Encryption Padding scheme defined in PKCS #1, where
<digest> should be replaced by the message digest and <mgf>
by the mask generation function. Example: OAEPWithMD5AndMGF1Padding.
PKCS5Padding: The padding
scheme described in: RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #5: Password-Based
Encryption Standard," version 1.5, November 1993.
SSL3Padding: The padding scheme defined in the SSL
Protocol Version 3.0, November 18, 1996, section 5.2.3.2 (CBC block
cipher):
The size of an instance of a GenericBlockCipher must be a
multiple of the block cipher's block length.
The padding length, which is always present, contributes
to the padding, which implies that if:
sizeof(content) + sizeof(MAC) % block_length = 0,
padding has to be (block_length - 1) bytes long, because of the
existence of padding_length.
This make the padding scheme similar (but not quite) to
PKCS5Padding, where the padding length is encoded in the padding (and
ranges from 1 to block_length). With the SSL scheme, the
sizeof(padding) is encoded in the always present padding_length
and therefore ranges from 0 to block_length-1.
Note that this padding mechanism is not supported by the
"SunJCE" provider.
KeyAgreement
The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting
an instance of KeyAgreement:
DiffieHellman: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement as defined
in PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, RSA Laboratories,
version 1.4, November 1993.
ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) as described in RFC 3278: "Use of
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)."
ECMQV (Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone) as
described in ECC
Cipher Suites For TLS (January 2004 draft).
KeyGenerator
The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting
an instance of KeyGenerator:
AES
ARCFOUR/RC4
Blowfish
DES
DESede
HmacMD5
HmacSHA1
HmacSHA256
HmacSHA384
HmacSHA512
RC2
KeyPairGenerator
The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting
an instance of KeyPairGenerator:
DiffieHellman
SecretKeyFactory
The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting
an instance of SecretKeyFactory:
DES
DESede
PBEWith<digest>And<encryption> or PBEWith<prf>And<encryption>:
Secret-key factory for use with PKCS #5 password-based encryption,
where <digest> is a message digest, <prf> is a
pseudo-random function, and <encryption> is an encryption
algorithm. Examples: PBEWithMD5AndDES (PKCS #5, v 1.5) and PBEWithHmacSHA1AndDESede
(PKCS #5, v 2.0). Note: These both use only the low order 8 bits of
each password character.
KeyFactory
The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting
an instance of KeyFactory:
DiffieHellman
AlgorithmParameterGenerator
The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting
an instance of AlgorithmParameterGenerator:
DiffieHellman
AlgorithmParameters
The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting
an instance of AlgorithmParameters:
AES
Blowfish
DES
DESede
DiffieHellman
OAEP
PBE
PBEWith<digest>And<encryption>
RC2
MAC
The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting
an instance of Mac:
HmacMD5: The HMAC-MD5 keyed-hashing algorithm as
defined in RFC 2104: "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication"
(February 1997).
HmacSHA1: The HMAC-SHA1 keyed-hashing algorithm as
defined in RFC 2104: "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication"
(February 1997).
HmacSHA256: The HmacSHA256 algorithm as defined in RFC 2104 "HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication" (February 1997) with SHA-256
as the message digest algorithm.
HmacSHA384: The HmacSHA384 algorithm as defined in RFC 2104 "HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication" (February 1997) with SHA-384
as the message digest algorithm.
HmacSHA512: The HmacSHA512 algorithm as defined in RFC 2104 "HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication" (February 1997) with SHA-512
as the message digest algorithm.
PBEWith<mac>: MAC for use with PKCS #5 v 2.0
password-based message authentication standard, where <mac> is a
Message Authentication Code algorithm name. Example: PBEWithHmacSHA1.
Keystore Types
The following types can be specified when requesting an instance
of KeyStore:
The following exemption mechanism names can be specified in the
permission policy file that accompanies an application considered
"exempt" from cryptographic restrictions:
KeyEscrow: An encryption system with a backup
decryption capability that allows authorized persons (users, officers
of an organization, and government officials), under certain prescribed
conditions, to decrypt ciphertext with the help of information supplied
by one or more trusted parties who hold special data recovery keys.
KeyRecovery: A method of obtaining the secret key used
to lock encrypted data. One use is as a means of providing fail-safe
access to a corporation's own encrypted information in times of
disaster.
KeyWeakening: A method in which a part of the key can
be escrowed or recovered.
The SunJCE provider enforces the following restrictions on the
keysize passed to the initialization methods of the following classes:
KeyGenerator
Restrictions (by algorithm):
DES: keysize must be equal to 56
Triple DES: keysize must be equal to 112
or 168
Note: A keysize of 112 will generate a
Triple DES key with 2 intermediate keys, and a keysize of 168
will generate a Triple DES key with 3 intermediate keys.
Blowfish: keysize must be a multiple of 8,
and can only range from 32 to 448,
inclusive
KeyPairGenerator
Restrictions (by algorithm):
Diffie-Hellman: keysize must be a multiple of 64,
and can only range from 512 to 1024,
inclusive
AlgorithmParameterGenerator
Restrictions (by algorithm):
Diffie-Hellman: keysize must be a multiple of 64,
and can only range from 512 to 1024,
inclusive
JCE represents its jurisdiction policy files as J2SE-style policy
files with corresponding permission statements. As described in Default
Policy Implementation and Policy File Syntax, a J2SE policy file
specifies what permissions are allowed for code from specified code
sources. A permission represents access to a system resource. In the
case of JCE, the "resources" are cryptography algorithms, and code
sources do not need to be specified, because the cryptographic
restrictions apply to all code.
A jurisdiction policy file consists of a very basic "grant entry"
containing one or more "permission entries."
grant { <permission entries>; };
The format of a permission entry in a jurisdiction policy file is:
permission <crypto permission class name>[ <alg_name> [[, <exemption mechanism name>][, <maxKeySize> [, <AlgorithmParameterSpec class name>, <parameters for constructing an AlgorithmParameterSpec object>]]]];
A sample jurisdiction policy file that includes restricting the
"Blowfish" algorithm to maximum key sizes of 64 bits is:
grant { permission javax.crypto.CryptoPermission "Blowfish", 64; . . .; };
A permission entry must begin with the word permission.
The <crypto permission class name> in the template
above would actually be a specific permission class name, such as javax.crypto.CryptoPermission.
A crypto permission class reflects the ability of an application/applet
to use certain algorithms with certain key sizes in certain
environments. There are two crypto permission classes: CryptoPermission
and CryptoAllPermission. The special CryptoAllPermission
class implies all cryptography-related permissions, that is, it
specifies that there are no cryptography-related restrictions.
The <alg_name>, when utilized, is a quoted string specifying
the standard name (see Appendix A) of a
cryptography algorithm, such as "DES" or "RSA".
The <exemption mechanism name>, when specified, is a quoted
string indicating an exemption mechanism which, if enforced, enables a
reduction in cryptographic restrictions. Exemption mechanism names that
can be used include "KeyRecovery" "KeyEscrow", and "KeyWeakening".
<maxKeySize> is an integer specifying the maximum key size
(in bits) allowed for the specified algorithm.
For some algorithms it may not be sufficient to specify the
algorithm strength in terms of just a key size. For example, in the
case of the "RC5" algorithm, the number of rounds must also be
considered. For algorithms whose strength needs to be expressed as more
than a key size, the permission entry should also specify an
AlgorithmParameterSpec class name (such as javax.crypto.spec.RC5ParameterSpec)
and a list of parameters for constructing the specified
AlgorithmParameterSpec object.
Items that appear in a permission entry must appear in the
specified order. An entry is terminated with a semicolon.
Case is unimportant for the identifiers (grant, permission)
but is significant for the <crypto permission class name>
or for any string that is passed in as a value.
Note: An "*" can be used as a wildcard for any permission entry
option. For example, an "*" (without the quotes) for an
<alg_name> option means "all algorithms."
Due to import control restrictions, the jurisdiction policy files
shipped with JDK 5.0 allow "strong" but limited
cryptography to be used. Here are the maximum key sizes allowed by this
"strong" version of the jurisdiction policy files:
/* * Copyright 1997-2001 by Sun Microsystems, Inc., * 901 San Antonio Road, Palo Alto, California, 94303, U.S.A. * All rights reserved. * * This software is the confidential and proprietary information * of Sun Microsystems, Inc. ("Confidential Information"). You * shall not disclose such Confidential Information and shall use * it only in accordance with the terms of the license agreement * you entered into with Sun. */
/** * This program executes the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol * between 2 parties: Alice and Bob. * * By default, preconfigured parameters (1024-bit prime modulus and base * generator used by SKIP) are used. * If this program is called with the "-gen" option, a new set of * parameters is created. */
if (mode.equals("GENERATE_DH_PARAMS")) { // Some central authority creates new DH parameters System.out.println ("Creating Diffie-Hellman parameters (takes VERY long) ..."); AlgorithmParameterGenerator paramGen = AlgorithmParameterGenerator.getInstance("DH"); paramGen.init(512); AlgorithmParameters params = paramGen.generateParameters(); dhSkipParamSpec = (DHParameterSpec)params.getParameterSpec (DHParameterSpec.class); } else { // use some pre-generated, default DH parameters System.out.println("Using SKIP Diffie-Hellman parameters"); dhSkipParamSpec = new DHParameterSpec(skip1024Modulus, skip1024Base); }
/* * Alice creates her own DH key pair, using the DH parameters from * above */ System.out.println("ALICE: Generate DH keypair ..."); KeyPairGenerator aliceKpairGen = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("DH"); aliceKpairGen.initialize(dhSkipParamSpec); KeyPair aliceKpair = aliceKpairGen.generateKeyPair();
// Alice creates and initializes her DH KeyAgreement object System.out.println("ALICE: Initialization ..."); KeyAgreement aliceKeyAgree = KeyAgreement.getInstance("DH"); aliceKeyAgree.init(aliceKpair.getPrivate());
// Alice encodes her public key, and sends it over to Bob. byte[] alicePubKeyEnc = aliceKpair.getPublic().getEncoded();
/* * Let's turn over to Bob. Bob has received Alice's public key * in encoded format. * He instantiates a DH public key from the encoded key material. */ KeyFactory bobKeyFac = KeyFactory.getInstance("DH"); X509EncodedKeySpec x509KeySpec = new X509EncodedKeySpec (alicePubKeyEnc); PublicKey alicePubKey = bobKeyFac.generatePublic(x509KeySpec);
/* * Bob gets the DH parameters associated with Alice's public key. * He must use the same parameters when he generates his own key * pair. */ DHParameterSpec dhParamSpec = ((DHPublicKey)alicePubKey).getParams();
// Bob creates his own DH key pair System.out.println("BOB: Generate DH keypair ..."); KeyPairGenerator bobKpairGen = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("DH"); bobKpairGen.initialize(dhParamSpec); KeyPair bobKpair = bobKpairGen.generateKeyPair();
// Bob creates and initializes his DH KeyAgreement object System.out.println("BOB: Initialization ..."); KeyAgreement bobKeyAgree = KeyAgreement.getInstance("DH"); bobKeyAgree.init(bobKpair.getPrivate());
// Bob encodes his public key, and sends it over to Alice. byte[] bobPubKeyEnc = bobKpair.getPublic().getEncoded();
/* * Alice uses Bob's public key for the first (and only) phase * of her version of the DH * protocol. * Before she can do so, she has to instanticate a DH public key * from Bob's encoded key material. */ KeyFactory aliceKeyFac = KeyFactory.getInstance("DH"); x509KeySpec = new X509EncodedKeySpec(bobPubKeyEnc); PublicKey bobPubKey = aliceKeyFac.generatePublic(x509KeySpec); System.out.println("ALICE: Execute PHASE1 ..."); aliceKeyAgree.doPhase(bobPubKey, true);
/* * Bob uses Alice's public key for the first (and only) phase * of his version of the DH * protocol. */ System.out.println("BOB: Execute PHASE1 ..."); bobKeyAgree.doPhase(alicePubKey, true);
/* * At this stage, both Alice and Bob have completed the DH key * agreement protocol. * Both generate the (same) shared secret. */ byte[] aliceSharedSecret = aliceKeyAgree.generateSecret(); int aliceLen = aliceSharedSecret.length;
byte[] bobSharedSecret = new byte[aliceLen]; int bobLen; try { // show example of what happens if you // provide an output buffer that is too short bobLen = bobKeyAgree.generateSecret(bobSharedSecret, 1); } catch (ShortBufferException e) { System.out.println(e.getMessage()); } // provide output buffer of required size bobLen = bobKeyAgree.generateSecret(bobSharedSecret, 0);
if (!java.util.Arrays.equals(aliceSharedSecret, bobSharedSecret)) throw new Exception("Shared secrets differ"); System.out.println("Shared secrets are the same");
/* * Now let's return the shared secret as a SecretKey object * and use it for encryption. First, we generate SecretKeys for the * "DES" algorithm (based on the raw shared secret data) and * then we use DES in ECB mode * as the encryption algorithm. DES in ECB mode does not require any * parameters. * * Then we use DES in CBC mode, which requires an initialization * vector (IV) parameter. In CBC mode, you need to initialize the * Cipher object with an IV, which can be supplied using the * javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec class. Note that you have to use * the same IV for encryption and decryption: If you use a different * IV for decryption than you used for encryption, decryption will * fail. * * Note: If you do not specify an IV when you initialize the * Cipher object for encryption, the underlying implementation * will generate a random one, which you have to retrieve using the * javax.crypto.Cipher.getParameters() method, which returns an * instance of java.security.AlgorithmParameters. You need to transfer * the contents of that object (e.g., in encoded format, obtained via * the AlgorithmParameters.getEncoded() method) to the party who will * do the decryption. When initializing the Cipher for decryption, * the (reinstantiated) AlgorithmParameters object must be passed to * the Cipher.init() method. */ System.out.println("Return shared secret as SecretKey object ..."); // Bob // Note: The call to bobKeyAgree.generateSecret above reset the key // agreement object, so we call doPhase again prior to another // generateSecret call bobKeyAgree.doPhase(alicePubKey, true); SecretKey bobDesKey = bobKeyAgree.generateSecret("DES");
// Alice // Note: The call to aliceKeyAgree.generateSecret above reset the key // agreement object, so we call doPhase again prior to another // generateSecret call aliceKeyAgree.doPhase(bobPubKey, true); SecretKey aliceDesKey = aliceKeyAgree.generateSecret("DES");
/* * Bob encrypts, using DES in ECB mode */ Cipher bobCipher = Cipher.getInstance("DES/ECB/PKCS5Padding"); bobCipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, bobDesKey);
byte[] cleartext = "This is just an example".getBytes(); byte[] ciphertext = bobCipher.doFinal(cleartext);
/* * Alice decrypts, using DES in ECB mode */ Cipher aliceCipher = Cipher.getInstance("DES/ECB/PKCS5Padding"); aliceCipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, aliceDesKey); byte[] recovered = aliceCipher.doFinal(ciphertext);
if (!java.util.Arrays.equals(cleartext, recovered)) throw new Exception("DES in CBC mode recovered text is " + "different from cleartext"); System.out.println("DES in ECB mode recovered text is " + "same as cleartext");
/* * Bob encrypts, using DES in CBC mode */ bobCipher = Cipher.getInstance("DES/CBC/PKCS5Padding"); bobCipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, bobDesKey);
cleartext = "This is just an example".getBytes(); ciphertext = bobCipher.doFinal(cleartext); // Retrieve the parameter that was used, and transfer it to Alice in // encoded format byte[] encodedParams = bobCipher.getParameters().getEncoded();
/* * Alice decrypts, using DES in CBC mode */ // Instantiate AlgorithmParameters object from parameter encoding // obtained from Bob AlgorithmParameters params = AlgorithmParameters.getInstance("DES"); params.init(encodedParams); aliceCipher = Cipher.getInstance("DES/CBC/PKCS5Padding"); aliceCipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, aliceDesKey, params); recovered = aliceCipher.doFinal(ciphertext);
if (!java.util.Arrays.equals(cleartext, recovered)) throw new Exception("DES in CBC mode recovered text is " + "different from cleartext"); System.out.println("DES in CBC mode recovered text is " + "same as cleartext"); }
/* * Converts a byte to hex digit and writes to the supplied buffer */ private void byte2hex(byte b, StringBuffer buf) { char[] hexChars = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' }; int high = ((b & 0xf0) >> 4); int low = (b & 0x0f); buf.append(hexChars[high]); buf.append(hexChars[low]); }
/* * Converts a byte array to hex string */ private String toHexString(byte[] block) { StringBuffer buf = new StringBuffer();
int len = block.length;
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) { byte2hex(block[i], buf); if (i < len-1) { buf.append(":"); } } return buf.toString(); }
/* * Prints the usage of this test. */ private void usage() { System.err.print("DHKeyAgreement usage: "); System.err.println("[-gen]"); }
/* * Copyright 1997-2001 by Sun Microsystems, Inc., * 901 San Antonio Road, Palo Alto, California, 94303, U.S.A. * All rights reserved. * * This software is the confidential and proprietary information * of Sun Microsystems, Inc. ("Confidential Information"). You * shall not disclose such Confidential Information and shall use * it only in accordance with the terms of the license agreement * you entered into with Sun. */
/** * This program executes the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol * between 3 parties: Alice, Bob, and Carol. * * We use the same 1024-bit prime modulus and base generator that are * used by SKIP. */
// Alice uses Carol's public key Key ac = aliceKeyAgree.doPhase(carolKpair.getPublic(), false);
// Bob uses Alice's public key Key ba = bobKeyAgree.doPhase(aliceKpair.getPublic(), false);
// Carol uses Bob's public key Key cb = carolKeyAgree.doPhase(bobKpair.getPublic(), false);
// Alice uses Carol's result from above aliceKeyAgree.doPhase(cb, true);
// Bob uses Alice's result from above bobKeyAgree.doPhase(ac, true);
// Carol uses Bob's result from above carolKeyAgree.doPhase(ba, true);
// Alice, Bob and Carol compute their secrets byte[] aliceSharedSecret = aliceKeyAgree.generateSecret(); System.out.println("Alice secret: " + toHexString(aliceSharedSecret));
// Compare Alice and Bob if (!java.util.Arrays.equals(aliceSharedSecret, bobSharedSecret)) throw new Exception("Alice and Bob differ"); System.out.println("Alice and Bob are the same");
// Compare Bob and Carol if (!java.util.Arrays.equals(bobSharedSecret, carolSharedSecret)) throw new Exception("Bob and Carol differ"); System.out.println("Bob and Carol are the same"); }
/* * Converts a byte to hex digit and writes to the supplied buffer */ private void byte2hex(byte b, StringBuffer buf) { char[] hexChars = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' }; int high = ((b & 0xf0) >> 4); int low = (b & 0x0f); buf.append(hexChars[high]); buf.append(hexChars[low]); }
/* * Converts a byte array to hex string */ private String toHexString(byte[] block) { StringBuffer buf = new StringBuffer();
int len = block.length;
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) { byte2hex(block[i], buf); if (i < len-1) { buf.append(":"); } } return buf.toString(); }
/* * Prints the usage of this test. */ private void usage() { System.err.print("DHKeyAgreement usage: "); System.err.println("[-gen]"); }
/* * Copyright 1997-2001 by Sun Microsystems, Inc., * 901 San Antonio Road, Palo Alto, California, 94303, U.S.A. * All rights reserved. * * This software is the confidential and proprietary information * of Sun Microsystems, Inc. ("Confidential Information"). You * shall not disclose such Confidential Information and shall use * it only in accordance with the terms of the license agreement * you entered into with Sun. */
/** * This program generates a Blowfish key, retrieves its raw bytes, and * then reinstantiates a Blowfish key from the key bytes. * The reinstantiated key is used to initialize a Blowfish cipher for * encryption. */
public class BlowfishKey {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
KeyGenerator kgen = KeyGenerator.getInstance("Blowfish"); SecretKey skey = kgen.generateKey(); byte[] raw = skey.getEncoded(); SecretKeySpec skeySpec = new SecretKeySpec(raw, "Blowfish");
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("Blowfish"); cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, skeySpec); byte[] encrypted = cipher.doFinal("This is just an example".getBytes()); } }
/* * Copyright 1997-2001 by Sun Microsystems, Inc., * 901 San Antonio Road, Palo Alto, California, 94303, U.S.A. * All rights reserved. * * This software is the confidential and proprietary information * of Sun Microsystems, Inc. ("Confidential Information"). You * shall not disclose such Confidential Information and shall use * it only in accordance with the terms of the license agreement * you entered into with Sun. */
import java.security.*; import javax.crypto.*;
/** * This program demonstrates how to generate a secret-key object for * HMAC-MD5, and initialize an HMAC-MD5 object with it. */
public class initMac {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
// Generate secret key for HMAC-MD5 KeyGenerator kg = KeyGenerator.getInstance("HmacMD5"); SecretKey sk = kg.generateKey();
// Get instance of Mac object implementing HMAC-MD5, and // initialize it with the above secret key Mac mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacMD5"); mac.init(sk); byte[] result = mac.doFinal("Hi There".getBytes()); } }