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JavaTM Cryptography Architecture

API Specification & Reference


Last Modified: 25 July 2004

Introduction
Design Principles
Architecture
Concepts
 
What's New in JCE in the Java 2 Platform Standard Edition 5
 
Core Classes and Interfaces
The Provider Class
How Provider Implementations are Requested and Supplied
Installing Providers
The Security Class
The MessageDigest Class
The Signature Class
Algorithm Parameters Classes
How to Make Applications "Exempt" from Cryptographic Restrictions
Code Examples
Computing a MessageDigest Object
Generating a Pair of Keys
Generating and Verifying a Signature Using Generated Keys
Generating/Verifying Signatures Using Key Specifications and KeyFactory
Determining If Two Keys Are Equal
Reading Base64-Encoded Certificates
Parsing a Certificate Reply
Using Encryption
Using Password-Based Encryption
Using Key Agreement
Appendix A: Standard Names

Appendix B: Algorithms

Appendix C: SunJCE Keysize Restrictions

Appendix D: Jurisdiction Policy File Format

Appendix E: Maximum Key Sizes Allowed by "Strong" Jurisdiction Policy Files

Appendix F: Sample Programs
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange between 2 Parties
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange between 3 Parties
Blowfish Example
HMAC-MD5 Example

Introduction

The Security API is a core API of the Java programming language, built around the java.security package (and its subpackages). This API is designed to allow developers to incorporate both low-level and high-level security functionality into their programs.

The first release of Security API in JDK 1.1 introduced the "Java Cryptography Architecture" (JCA), a framework for accessing and developing cryptographic functionality for the Java platform. In JDK 1.1, the JCA included APIs for digital signatures and message digests.

In subsequent releases, the Java 2 SDK significantly extended the Java Cryptography Architecture, as described in this document. It also upgraded the certificate management infrastructure to support X.509 v3 certificates, and introduced a new Java Security Architecture for fine-grain, highly configurable, flexible, and extensible access control.

The Java Cryptography Architecture encompasses the parts of the Java 2 SDK Security API related to cryptography, as well as a set of conventions and specifications provided in this document. It includes a "provider" architecture that allows for multiple and interoperable cryptography implementations.

The JavaTM Cryptography Extension (JCE) provides a framework and implementations for encryption, key generation and key agreement, and Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms. Support for encryption includes symmetric, asymmetric, block, and stream ciphers. The software also supports secure streams and sealed objects.

JCE was previously an optional package (extension) to the JavaTM 2 SDK, Standard Edition (Java 2 SDK), versions 1.2.x and 1.3.x. JCE has been integrated into the Java 2 SDK since the 1.4 release.

The JCE API covers:

J2SE 5 comes standard with a JCE provider named "SunJCE", which comes pre-installed and registered and which supplies the following cryptographic services:

A Note on Terminology

The JCE within the JDK includes two software components:

Throughout this document, the term "JCE" by itself refers to the JCE framework in J2SE 5. Whenever the JCE provider supplied with J2SE 5 is mentioned, it will be referred to explicitly as the "SunJCE" provider.
Note: The most recent version of this JCA specification can be found online at: http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/guide/security/CryptoSpec.html.

Design Principles

The Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) was designed around these principles:

Implementation independence and algorithm independence are complementary; you can use cryptographic services, such as digital signatures and message digests, without worrying about the implementation details or even the algorithms that form the basis for these concepts. When complete algorithm-independence is not possible, the JCA provides standardized, algorithm-specific APIs. When implementation-independence is not desirable, the JCA lets developers indicate a specific implementation.

Algorithm independence is achieved by defining types of cryptographic "engines" (services), and defining classes that provide the functionality of these cryptographic engines. These classes are called engine classes, and examples are the MessageDigest, Signature, KeyFactory, and KeyPairGenerator classes.

Implementation independence is achieved using a "provider"-based architecture. The term Cryptographic Service Provider (used interchangeably with "provider" in this document) refers to a package or set of packages that implement one or more cryptographic services, such as digital signature algorithms, message digest algorithms, and key conversion services. A program may simply request a particular type of object (such as a Signature object) implementing a particular service (such as the DSA signature algorithm) and get an implementation from one of the installed providers. If desired, a program may instead request an implementation from a specific provider. Providers may be updated transparently to the application, for example when faster or more secure versions are available.

Implementation interoperability means that various implementations can work with each other, use each other's keys, or verify each other's signatures. This would mean, for example, that for the same algorithms, a key generated by one provider would be usable by another, and a signature generated by one provider would be verifiable by another.

Algorithm extensibility means that new algorithms that fit in one of the supported engine classes can be added easily.

Architecture

Cryptographic Service Providers

The Java Cryptography Architecture introduced the notion of a Cryptographic Service Provider (used interchangeably with "provider" in this document). This term refers to a package (or a set of packages) that supplies a concrete implementation of a subset of the cryptography aspects of the Security API.

For example, in JDK 1.1 a provider could contain an implementation of one or more digital signature algorithms, message digest algorithms, and key generation algorithms. Java 2 SDK adds five additional types of services: key factories, keystore creation and management, algorithm parameter management, algorithm parameter generation, and certificate factories. It also enables a provider to supply a random number generation (RNG) algorithm. Previously, RNGs were not provider-based; a particular algorithm was hard-coded in the JDK.

As previously noted, a program may simply request a particular type of object (such as a Signature object) for a particular service (such as the DSA signature algorithm) and get an implementation from one of the installed providers. Alternatively, the program can request the objects from a specific provider. (Each provider has a name used to refer to it.)

Sun's version of the Java runtime environment comes standard with a default provider, named SUN. Other Java runtime environments may not necessarily supply the SUN provider. The SUN provider package includes:

Each SDK installation has one or more provider packages installed. New providers may be added statically or dynamically (see the Provider and Security classes). The Java Cryptography Architecture offers a set of APIs that allow users to query which providers are installed and what services they support.

Clients may configure their runtime with different providers, and specify a preference order for each of them. The preference order is the order in which providers are searched for requested services when no specific provider is requested.

Key Management

A database called a "keystore" can be used to manage a repository of keys and certificates. A keystore is available to applications that need it for authentication or signing purposes.

Applications can access a keystore via an implementation of the KeyStore class, which is in the java.security package. A default KeyStore implementation is provided by Sun Microsystems. It implements the keystore as a file, using a proprietary keystore type (format) named "JKS".

Applications can choose different types of keystore implementations from different providers, using the getInstance factory method supplied in the KeyStore class.

See the Key Management section for more information.

Concepts

This section covers the major concepts introduced in the API.

Engine Classes and Algorithms

An engine class defines a cryptographic service in an abstract fashion (without a concrete implementation).

A cryptographic service is always associated with a particular algorithm or type, and it either provides cryptographic operations (like those for digital signatures or message digests), generates or supplies the cryptographic material (keys or parameters) required for cryptographic operations, or generates data objects (keystores or certificates) that encapsulate cryptographic keys (which can be used in a cryptographic operation) in a secure fashion. For example, two of the engine classes are the Signature and KeyFactory classes. The Signature class provides access to the functionality of a digital signature algorithm. A DSA KeyFactory supplies a DSA private or public key (from its encoding or transparent specification) in a format usable by the initSign or initVerify methods, respectively, of a DSA Signature object.

The Java Cryptography Architecture encompasses the classes of the Java 2 SDK Security package related to cryptography, including the engine classes. Users of the API request and use instances of the engine classes to carry out corresponding operations. The following engine classes are defined in Java 2 SDK:

In the 1.4 release of the Java 2 SDK, the following new engines were added:
Note: A generator creates objects with brand-new contents, whereas a factory creates objects from existing material (for example, an encoding).
An engine class provides the interface to the functionality of a specific type of cryptographic service (independent of a particular cryptographic algorithm). It defines Application Programming Interface (API) methods that allow applications to access the specific type of cryptographic service it provides. The actual implementations (from one or more providers) are those for specific algorithms. The Signature engine class, for example, provides access to the functionality of a digital signature algorithm. The actual implementation supplied in a SignatureSpi subclass would be that for a specific kind of signature algorithm, such as SHA-1 with DSA, SHA-1 with RSA, or MD5 with RSA.

The application interfaces supplied by an engine class are implemented in terms of a Service Provider Interface (SPI). That is, for each engine class, there is a corresponding abstract SPI class, which defines the SPI methods that cryptographic service providers must implement.

An instance of an engine class, the API object, encapsulates (as a private field) an instance of the corresponding SPI class, the SPI object. All API methods of an API object are declared final and their implementations invoke the corresponding SPI methods of the encapsulated SPI object. An instance of an engine class (and of its corresponding SPI class) is created by a call to the getInstance factory method of the engine class.

The name of each SPI class is the same as that of the corresponding engine class, followed by Spi. For example, the SPI class corresponding to the Signature engine class is the SignatureSpi class.

Each SPI class is abstract. To supply the implementation of a particular type of service, for a specific algorithm, a provider must subclass the corresponding SPI class and provide implementations for all the abstract methods.

Another example of an engine class is the MessageDigest class, which provides access to a message digest algorithm. Its implementations, in MessageDigestSpi subclasses, may be those of various message digest algorithms such as SHA-1, MD5, or MD2.

As a final example, the KeyFactory engine class supports the conversion from opaque keys to transparent key specifications, and vice versa. (See the Key Specification Interfaces and Classes section.) The KeyFactorySpi subclass supplies an actual implementation for a specific type of keys, for example, DSA public and private keys.

Implementations and Providers

Implementations for various cryptographic services are provided by JCA Cryptographic Service Providers. Cryptographic service providers are essentially packages that supply one or more cryptographic service implementations. The Engine Classes and Algorithms section includes a list of implemenations supplied by SUN, the Java 2 SDK's default provider.

Other providers may define their own implementations of these services or of other services, such as one of the RSA-based signature algorithms or the MD2 message digest algorithm.

Factory Methods to Obtain Implementation Instances

For each engine class in the API, a particular implementation is requested and instantiated by calling a factory method on the engine class. A factory method is a static method that returns an instance of a class.

The basic mechanism for obtaining an appropriate Signature object, for example, is as follows: A user requests such an object by calling the getInstance method in the Signature class, specifying the name of a signature algorithm (such as "SHA1withDSA"), and, optionally, the name of the provider or the Provider class. The getInstance method finds an implementation that satisfies the supplied algorithm and provider parameters. If no provider is specified, getInstance searches the registered providers, in preference order, for one with an implementation of the specified algorithm. See The Provider Class for more information about registering providers.

Cryptographic Concepts

This section provides a high-level description of the concepts implemented by the API, and the exact meaning of the technical terms used in the API specification.

Encryption and Decryption

Encryption is the process of taking data (called cleartext) and a short string (a key), and producing data (ciphertext) meaningless to a third-party who does not know the key. Decryption is the inverse process: that of taking ciphertext and a short key string, and producing cleartext.

Password-Based Encryption

Password-Based Encryption (PBE) derives an encryption key from a password. In order to make the task of getting from password to key very time-consuming for an attacker, most PBE implementations will mix in a random number, known as a salt, to create the key.

Cipher

Encryption and decryption are done using a cipher. A cipher is an object capable of carrying out encryption and decryption according to an encryption scheme (algorithm).

Key Agreement

Key agreement is a protocol by which 2 or more parties can establish the same cryptographic keys, without having to exchange any secret information.

Message Authentication Code

A Message Authentication Code (MAC) provides a way to check the integrity of information transmitted over or stored in an unreliable medium, based on a secret key. Typically, message authentication codes are used between two parties that share a secret key in order to validate information transmitted between these parties.

A MAC mechanism that is based on cryptographic hash functions is referred to as HMAC. HMAC can be used with any cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5 or SHA-1, in combination with a secret shared key. HMAC is specified in RFC 2104.

What's New in JCE in J2SE 5

Here are the differences in JCE between v1.4 and J2SE 5:

Support for PKCS #11 Based Crypto Provider

In J2SE 5, a JCA/JCE provider, SunPKCS11 that acts as a generic gateway to the native PKCS#11 API has been implemented. PKCS#11 is the de-facto standard for crypto accelerators and also widely used to access cryptographic smartcards. The administrator/user can configure this provider to talk any PKCS#11 v2.x compliant token.

Here's an example of the configuration file format.

Integration with Solaris Cryptographic Framework

On Solaris 10, the default Java security provider configuration has been changed in J2SE 5 to include an instance of the SunPKCS11 provider that uses the Solaris Cryptographic Framework. It is the provider with the highest precedence thereby allowing all existing applications to take advantage of the improved performance on Solaris 10. There is no change in behavior on Solaris 8 and Solaris 9 systems.

As a result of this change, many cryptographic operations will execute several times as fast as before on all Solaris 10 systems. On systems with cryptographic hardware acceleration, the performance improvements may be two orders of magnitude.

Support for ECC Algorithm

Prior to J2SE 5, the JCA/JCE framework did not include support classes for ECC-related crypto algorithms. Users who wanted to use ECC had to depend on a 3rd party library that implemented ECC. However, this did not integrate well with existing JCA/JCE framework.

Starting in J2SE 5, full support for ECC classes to facilitate providers that support ECC have been included.

The following interfaces have been added:

The following classes have been added:

Added ByteBuffer API Support

Methods that take ByteBuffer arguments have been added to the JCE API and SPI classes that are used to process bulk data. Providers can override the engine* methods if they can process ByteBuffers more efficiently than byte[].

The following JCE methods have been added to support ByteBuffers: 

    javax.crypto.Mac.update(ByteBuffer input)
    javax.crypto.MacSpi.engineUpdate(ByteBuffer input)
    javax.crypto.Cipher.update(ByteBuffer input, ByteBuffer output)
    javax.crypto.Cipher.doFinal(ByteBuffer input, ByteBuffer output)
    javax.crypto.CipherSpi.engineUpdate(ByteBuffer input, ByteBuffer output)
    javax.crypto.CipherSpi.engineDoFinal(ByteBuffer input, ByteBuffer output)
The following JCA methods have been added to support ByteBuffers: 
    java.security.MessageDigest.update(ByteBuffer input)
    java.security.Signature.update(ByteBuffer data)
    java.security.SignatureSpi.engineUpdate(ByteBuffer data)
    java.security.MessageDigestSpi.engineUpdate(ByteBuffer input)

Support for RC2ParameterSpec

The RC2 algorithm implementation has been enhanced in J2SE 5 to support effective key size that is distinct from the length of the input key.

Full support for XML Encryption RSA-OAEP Algorithm

Prior to J2SE 5, JCE did not define any parameter class for specifying the non-default values used in OAEP and PSS padding as defined in PKCS#1 v2.1 and the RSA-OAEP Key Transport algorithm in the W3C Recommendation for XML Encryption. Therefore, there was no generic way for applications to specify non-default values used in OAEP and PSS padding.

In J2SE 5, new parameter classes have been added to fully support OAEP padding and the existing PSS parameter class was enhanced with APIs to fully support RSA PSS signature implementations. Also, SunJCE provider has been enhanced to accept OAEPParameterSpec when OAEPPadding is used.

The following classes have been added:

The following methods and fields have been added to java.security.spec.PSSParameterSpec: 

    public static final PSSParameterSpec DEFAULT
    public PSSParameterSpec(String mdName, String mgfName,
                            AlgorithmParameterSpec mgfSpec,
                            int saltLen, int trailerField)
    public String getDigestAlgorithm()
    public String getMGFAlgorithm()
    public AlgorithmParameterSpec getMGFParameters()
    public int getTrailerField()

Simplified Retrieval of PKCS8EncodedKeySpec from javax.crypto.EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo

In J2SE 5, javax.crypto.EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo only has one method, getKeySpec(Cipher) for retrieving the PKCS8EncodedKeySpec from the encrypted data. This limitation requires users to specify a cipher which is initialized with the decryption key and parameters. When users only have the decryption key, they would have to first retrieve the parameters out of this EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo object, get hold of matching Cipher implementation, initialize it, and then call the getKeySpec(Cipher) method.

To make EncyptedPrivateKeyInfo easier to use and to make its API consistent with javax.crypto.SealedObject, the following methods have been added to javax.crypto.EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo: 

    getKeySpec(Key decryptKey)
    getKeySpec(Key decryptKey, String provider)

Ability to Dynamically Determine Maximum Allowable Key Length

In 1.4.2, the crypto jurisdiction policy files bundled in J2SE limits the maximum key length (and parameter value for some crypto algorithms) that can be used for encryption/decryption. Users who desire unlimited version of crypto jurisdiction files must download them separately.

Also, an exception is thrown when the Cipher instance is initialized with keys (or parameters for certain crypto algorithms) exceeds the maximum values allowed by the crypto jurisdiction files.

In J2SE 5, the Cipher class has been updated to provide the maximum values for key length and parameters configured in the jurisdiction policy files, so that applications can use a shorter key length when the default (limited strength) jurisdiction policy files are installed.

The following methods have been added to javax.crypto.Cipher: 

    public static final int getMaxAllowedKeyLength(String transformation)
             throws NoSuchAlgorithmException

    public static final AlgorithmParameterSpec
             getMaxAllowedParameterSpec(String transformation)
             throws NoSuchAlgorithmException;

Support for HmacSHA256, HmacSHA384, HmacSHA512

Support for HmacSHA-256, HmacSHA-384, and HmacSHA-512 algorithms have been added to J2SE 5.

Support for RSA Encryption to SunJCE Provider

A publicly accessible RSA encryption implementation has been added to the SunJCE provider.

Support for RC2 and ARCFOUR Ciphers to SunJCE Provider

The SunJCE provider now implements the RC2 (RFC 2268) and ARCFOUR (an RC4TM-compatible algorithm) ciphers.

Support for "PBEWithSHA1AndDESede" and "PBEWithSHA1AndRC2_40" Ciphers

Added support for PBEWithSHA1AndDESede and PBEWithSHA1AndRC2_40 ciphers in SunJCE provider.

Support for XML Encryption Padding Algorithm in JCE Block Encryption Ciphers

W3C XML Encryption defines a new padding algorithm, "ISO10126Padding," for block ciphers. See 5.2 Block Encryption Algorithms for more information.

To allow Sun's provider to be used by XML Encryption implementations and JSR 106 providers, we have added support for this padding in J2SE 5.

Core Classes and Interfaces

This section discusses the core classes and interfaces provided in the Java Cryptography Architecture:

engine classes

  • the Key interfaces and classes

  • the Algorithm Parameter Specification Interfaces and Classes and the Key Specification Interfaces and Classes

    This section shows the signatures of the main methods in each class and interface. Examples for some of these classes (MessageDigest, Signature, KeyPairGenerator, SecureRandom, KeyFactory, and key specification classes) are supplied in the corresponding Examples sections. The complete reference documentation for the relevant Security API packages can be found in:

    • The Provider Class

    The term "Cryptographic Service Provider" (used interchangeably with "provider" in this document) refers to a package or set of packages that supply a concrete implementation of a subset of the Java 2 SDK Security API cryptography features. The Provider class is the interface to such a package or set of packages. It has methods for accessing the provider name, version number, and other information. Please note that in addition to registering implementations of cryptographic services, the Provider class can also be used to register implementations of other security services that might get defined as part of the Java 2 SDK Security API or one of its extensions.

    To supply implementations of cryptographic services, an entity (e.g., a development group) writes the implementation code and creates a subclass of the Provider class. The constructor of the Provider subclass sets the values of various properties; the Java 2 SDK Security API uses these values to look up the services that the provider implements. In other words, the subclass specifies the names of the classes implementing the services.

    There are several types of services that can be implemented by provider packages; for more information, see Engine Classes and Algorithms.

    The different implementations may have different characteristics. Some may be software-based, while others may be hardware-based. Some may be platform-independent, while others may be platform-specific. Some provider source code may be available for review and evaluation, while some may not. The Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) lets both end-users and developers decide what their needs are.

    In this section we explain how end-users install the cryptography implementations that fit their needs, and how developers request the implementations that fit theirs.

    Note: For information about implementing a provider, see the guide How To Implement a Provider for the Java Cryptography Architecture.

    How Provider Implementations Are Requested and Supplied

    For each engine class in the API, a particular implementation is requested and instantiated by calling a getInstance method on the engine class, specifying the name of the desired algorithm and, optionally, the name of the provider (or the Provider class) whose implementation is desired.

    If no provider is specified, getInstance searches the registered providers for an implementation of the requested cryptographic service associated with the named algorithm. In any given Java Virtual Machine (JVM), providers are installed in a given preference order, the order in which the provider list is searched if a specific provider is not requested. For example, suppose there are two providers installed in a JVM, PROVIDER_1 and PROVIDER_2. Assume that:

    Now let's look at three scenarios:
    1. If we are looking for an MD5 implementation. Both providers supply such an implementation. The PROVIDER_1 implementation is returned since PROVIDER_1 has the highest priority and is searched first.
    2. If we are looking for an MD5withRSA signature algorithm, PROVIDER_1 is first searched for it. No implementation is found, so PROVIDER_2 is searched. Since an implementation is found, it is returned.
    3. Suppose we are looking for a SHA1withRSA signature algorithm. Since no installed provider implements it, a NoSuchAlgorithmException is thrown.

    The getInstance methods that include a provider argument are for developers who want to specify which provider they want an algorithm from. A federal agency, for example, will want to use a provider implementation that has received federal certification. Let's assume that the SHA1withDSA implementation from PROVIDER_1 has not received such certification, while the DSA implementation of PROVIDER_2 has received it.

    A federal agency program would then have the following call, specifying PROVIDER_2 since it has the certified implementation: 

    Signature dsa = Signature.getInstance("SHA1withDSA", "PROVIDER_2");

    In this case, if PROVIDER_2 was not installed, a NoSuchProviderException would be thrown, even if another installed provider implements the algorithm requested.

    A program also has the option of getting a list of all the installed providers (using the getProviders method in the Security class) and choosing one from the list.

    Installing Providers

    There are two parts to installing a provider: installing the provider package classes, and configuring the provider.

    Installing the Provider Classes

    There are two possible ways to install the provider classes:

    1. Place a zip or JAR file containing the classes anywhere in your classpath.

    2. Supply your provider JAR file as an "installed" or "bundled" extension. For more information on how to deploy an extension, see How is an extension deployed?.

    Configuring the Provider

    The next step is to add the provider to your list of approved providers. This step can be done statically by editing the java.security file in the lib/security directory of the SDK; therefore, if the SDK is installed in a directory called j2sdk1.2, the file would be j2sdk1.2/lib/security/java.security. One of the types of properties you can set in java.security has the following form: 

    security.provider.n=masterClassName

    This declares a provider, and specifies its preference order n. The preference order is the order in which providers are searched for requested algorithms (when no specific provider is requested). The order is 1-based: 1 is the most preferred, followed by 2, and so on.

    masterClassName must specify the provider's master class. The provider's documentation will specify its master class. This class is always a subclass of the Provider class. The subclass constructor sets the values of various properties that are required for the Java Cryptography API to look up the algorithms or other facilities the provider implements.

    Suppose that the master class is COM.acme.provider.Acme, and that you would like to configure Acme as your third preferred provider. To do so, you would add the following line to the java.security file: 

    security.provider.3=COM.acme.provider.Acme
    Providers may also be registered dynamically. To do so, call either the addProvider or insertProviderAt method in the Security class. This type of registration is not persistent and can only be done by "trusted" programs. See Security.

    Provider Class Methods

    Each Providerclass instance has a (currently case-sensitive) name, a version number, and a string description of the provider and its services. You can query the Provider instance for this information by calling the following methods: 

    public String getName()
public double getVersion()
public String getInfo()

    The Security Class

    The Security class manages installed providers and security-wide properties. It only contains static methods and is never instantiated. The methods for adding or removing providers, and for setting Security properties, can only be executed by a trusted program. Currently, a "trusted program" is either

    The determination that code is considered trusted to perform an attempted action (such as adding a provider) requires that the applet is granted permission for that particular action.

    For example, in the Policy reference implementation, the policy configuration file(s) for a SDK installation specify what permissions (which types of system resource accesses) are allowed by code from specified code sources. (See below and the "Default Policy Implementation and Policy File Syntax" and "Java Security Architecture Specification" files for more information.)

    Code being executed is always considered to come from a particular "code source". The code source includes not only the location (URL) where the applet originated from, but also a reference to the public key(s) corresponding to the private key(s) used to sign the code. Public keys in a code source are referenced by (symbolic) alias names from the user's keystore .

    In a policy configuration file, a code source is represented by two components: a code base (URL), and an alias name (preceded by signedBy), where the alias name identifies the keystore entry containing the public key that must be used to verify the code's signature.

    Each "grant" statement in such a file grants a specified code source a set of permissions, specifying which actions are allowed.

    Here is a sample policy configuration file: 

    grant codeBase "file:/home/sysadmin/", signedBy "sysadmin" {
    permission java.security.SecurityPermission "insertProvider.*";
    permission java.security.SecurityPermission "removeProvider.*";
    permission java.security.SecurityPermission "putProviderProperty.*";
};
    This configuration file specifies that only code loaded from a signed JAR file from beneath the /home/sysadmin/ directory on the local file system can add or remove providers or set provider properties. (Note that the signature of the JAR file can be verified using the public key referenced by the alias name sysadmin in the user's keystore.)

    Either component of the code source (or both) may be missing. Here's an example of a configuration file where codeBase is missing: 

    grant signedBy "sysadmin" {
    permission java.security.SecurityPermission "insertProvider.*";
    permission java.security.SecurityPermission "removeProvider.*";
};
    If this policy is in effect, code that comes in a JAR File signed by sysadmin can add/remove providers--regardless of where the JAR File originated.

    Here's an example without a signer: 

    grant codeBase "file:/home/sysadmin/" {
    permission java.security.SecurityPermission "insertProvider.*";
    permission java.security.SecurityPermission "removeProvider.*";
};
    In this case, code that comes from anywhere within the /home/sysadmin/ directory on the local filesystem can add/remove providers. The code does not need to be signed.

    An example where neither codeBase nor signedBy is included is: 

    grant {
    permission java.security.SecurityPermission "insertProvider.*";
    permission java.security.SecurityPermission "removeProvider.*";
};
    Here, with both code source components missing, any code (regardless of where it originates, or whether or not it is signed, or who signed it) can add/remove providers.

    Managing Providers

    The following tables summarize the methods in the Security class you can use to query which Providers are installed, as well as to install or remove providers at runtime.

    Quering Providers
    Method Description
    static Provider[] getProviders() Returns an array containing all the installed providers (technically, the Provider subclass for each package provider). The order of the Providers in the array is their preference order.
    static Provider getProvider
    (String providerName)    		 Returns the Provider named providerName. It returns null if the Provider is not found.

    Adding Providers
    Method Description 
    static int 
    addProvider(Provider provider)
    		 Adds a Provider to the end of the list of installed Providers. It returns the preference position in which the Provider was added, or -1 if the Provider was not added because it was already installed.
    static int insertProviderAt
    (Provider provider, int position)

    Adds a new Provider at a specified position. If the given provider is installed at the requested position, the provider formerly at that position and all providers with a position greater than position are shifted up one position (towards the end of the list). This method returns the preference position in which the Provider was added, or -1 if the Provider was not added because it was already installed.

    Removing Providers
     Method  Description
    static void removeProvider(String name) Removes the Provider with the specified name. It returns silently if the provider is not installed. When the specified provider is removed, all providers located at a position greater than where the specified provider was are shifted down one position (towards the head of the list of installed providers).

    Note: If you want to change the preference position of a provider, you must first remove it, and then insert it back in at the new preference position.

    Security Properties

    The Security class maintains a list of system-wide security properties. These properties are accessible and settable by a trusted program via the following methods: 

    static String getProperty(String key)
static void setProperty(String key, String datum)

    The MessageDigest Class

    The MessageDigest class is an engine class designed to provide the functionality of cryptographically secure message digests such as SHA-1 or MD5. A cryptographically secure message digest takes arbitrary-sized input (a byte array), and generates a fixed-size output, called a digest or hash. A digest has two properties:

    Message digests are used to produce unique and reliable identifiers of data. They are sometimes called the "digital fingerprints" of data.

    Creating a MessageDigest Object

    The first step for computing a digest is to create a message digest instance. As with all engine classes, the way to get a MessageDigest object for a particular type of message digest algorithm is to call the getInstance static factory method on the MessageDigest class: 

    static MessageDigest getInstance(String algorithm)
    Note: The algorithm name is not case-sensitive. For example, all the following calls are equivalent: 
    MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-1")
MessageDigest.getInstance("sha-1")
MessageDigest.getInstance("sHa-1")

    A caller may optionally specify the name of a provider or a Provider instance, which guarantees that the implementation of the algorithm requested is from the specified provider: 

    static MessageDigest getInstance(String algorithm, String provider)
static MessageDigest getInstance(String algorithm, Provider provider)

    A call to getInstance returns an initialized message digest object. It thus does not need further initialization.

    Updating a Message Digest Object

    The next step for calculating the digest of some data is to supply the data to the initialized message digest object. This is done by calling one of the update methods: 

    void update(byte input)
void update(byte[] input)
void update(byte[] input, int offset, int len)

    Computing the Digest

    After the data has been supplied by calls to update methods, the digest is computed using a call to one of the digest methods: 

    byte[] digest()
byte[] digest(byte[] input)
int digest(byte[] buf, int offset, int len)

    The first two methods return the computed digest. The latter method stores the computed digest in the provided buffer buf, starting at offset. len is the number of bytes in buf allotted for the digest. The method returns the number of bytes actually stored in buf.

    A call to the digest method that takes an input byte array argument is equivalent to making a call to 

    void update(byte[] input)
    with the specified input, followed by a call to the digest method without any arguments.

    Please see the Examples section for more details.

    The Signature Class

    The Signature class is an engine class designed to provide the functionality of a cryptographic digital signature algorithm such as DSA or RSA with MD5. A cryptographically secure signature algorithm takes arbitrary-sized input and a private key and generates a relatively short (often fixed-size) string of bytes, called the signature, with the following properties:

    A Signature object can be used to sign data. It can also be used to verify whether or not an alleged signature is in fact the authentic signature of the data associated with it. Please see the Examples section for an example of signing and verifying data.

    Signature Object States

    Signature objects are modal objects. This means that a Signature object is always in a given state, where it may only do one type of operation. States are represented as final integer constants defined in their respective classes.

    The three states a Signature object may have are:

    When it is first created, a Signature object is in the UNINITIALIZED state. The Signature class defines two initialization methods, initSign and initVerify, which change the state to SIGN and VERIFY, respectively.

    Creating a Signature Object

    The first step for signing or verifying a signature is to create a Signature instance. As with all engine classes, the way to get a Signature object for a particular type of signature algorithm is to call the getInstance static factory method on the Signature class: 
    static Signature getInstance(String algorithm)
    Note: The algorithm name is not case-sensitive.
    A caller may optionally specify the name of a provider or the Provider class, which will guarantee that the implementation of the algorithm requested is from the named provider: 

    static Signature getInstance(String algorithm, String provider)
static Signature getInstance(String algorithm, Provider provider)

    Initializing a Signature Object

    A Signature object must be initialized before it is used. The initialization method depends on whether the object is going to be used for signing or for verification.

    If it is going to be used for signing, the object must first be initialized with the private key of the entity whose signature is going to be generated. This initialization is done by calling the method: 

    final void initSign(PrivateKey privateKey)
    This method puts the Signature object in the SIGN state.

    If instead the Signature object is going to be used for verification, it must first be initialized with the public key of the entity whose signature is going to be verified. This initialization is done by calling either of these methods: 

        final void initVerify(PublicKey publicKey)

    final void initVerify(Certificate certificate)

    This method puts the Signature object in the VERIFY state.

    Signing

    If the Signature object has been initialized for signing (if it is in the SIGN state), the data to be signed can then be supplied to the object. This is done by making one or more calls to one of the update methods: 

    final void update(byte b)
final void update(byte[] data)
final void update(byte[] data, int off, int len)

    Calls to the update method(s) should be made until all the data to be signed has been supplied to the Signature object.

    To generate the signature, simply call one of the sign methods: 

    final byte[] sign()
final int sign(byte[] outbuf, int offset, int len)

    The first method returns the signature result in a byte array. The second stores the signature result in the provided buffer outbuf, starting at offset. len is the number of bytes in outbuf allotted for the signature. The method returns the number of bytes actually stored.

    Signature encoding is algorithm specific. See Appendix B for more information about the use of ASN.1 encoding in the Java Cryptography Architecture.

    A call to a sign method resets the signature object to the state it was in when previously initialized for signing via a call to initSign. That is, the object is reset and available to generate another signature with the same private key, if desired, via new calls to update and sign.

    Alternatively, a new call can be made to initSign specifying a different private key, or to initVerify (to initialize the Signature object to verify a signature).

    Verifying

    If the Signature object has been initialized for verification (if it is in the VERIFY state), it can then verify if an alleged signature is in fact the authentic signature of the data associated with it. To start the process, the data to be verified (as opposed to the signature itself) is supplied to the object. The data is passed to the object by calling one of the update methods: 

    final void update(byte b)
final void update(byte[] data)
final void update(byte[] data, int off, int len)

    Calls to the update method(s) should be made until all the data to be verified has been supplied to the Signature object. The signature can now be verified by calling one of the verify methods: 

    final boolean verify(byte[] signature)

final boolean verify(byte[] signature, int offset, int length)

    The argument must be a byte array containing the signature. The argument must be a byte array containing the signature. This byte array would hold the signature bytes which were returned by a previous call to one of the sign methods.

    The verify method returns a boolean indicating whether or not the encoded signature is the authentic signature of the data supplied to the update method(s).

    A call to the verify method resets the signature object to its state when it was initialized for verification via a call to initVerify. That is, the object is reset and available to verify another signature from the identity whose public key was specified in the call to initVerify.

    Alternatively, a new call can be made to initVerify specifying a different public key (to initialize the Signature object for verifying a signature from a different entity), or to initSign (to initialize the Signature object for generating a signature).

    Algorithm Parameters Classes

    Algorithm Parameter Specification Interfaces and Classes

    An algorithm parameter specification is a transparent representation of the sets of parameters used with an algorithm.

    A transparent representation of a set of parameters means that you can access each parameter value in the set individually. You can access these values through one of the get methods defined in the corresponding specification class (e.g., DSAParameterSpec defines getP, getQ, and getG methods, to access p, q, and g, respectively).

    In contrast, the AlgorithmParameters class supplies an opaque representation, in which you have no direct access to the parameter fields. You can only get the name of the algorithm associated with the parameter set (via getAlgorithm) and some kind of encoding for the parameter set (via getEncoded).

    The algorithm parameter specification interfaces and classes in the java.security.spec package are described in the following sections.

    The AlgorithmParameterSpec Interface

    AlgorithmParameterSpec is an interface to a transparent specification of cryptographic parameters.

    This interface contains no methods or constants. Its only purpose is to group (and provide type safety for) all parameter specifications. All parameter specifications must implement this interface.

    The DSAParameterSpec Class

    This class (which implements the AlgorithmParameterSpec interface) specifies the set of parameters used with the DSA algorithm. It has the following methods: 
    BigInteger getP()
BigInteger getQ()
BigInteger getG()
    These methods return the DSA algorithm parameters: the prime p, the sub-prime q, and the base g.

    The AlgorithmParameters Class

    The AlgorithmParameters class is an engine class that provides an opaque representation of cryptographic parameters.

    An opaque representation is one in which you have no direct access to the parameter fields; you can only get the name of the algorithm associated with the parameter set and some kind of encoding for the parameter set. This is in contrast to a transparent representation of parameters, in which you can access each value individually, through one of the get methods defined in the corresponding specification class. Note that you can call the AlgorithmParameters getParameterSpec method to convert an AlgorithmParameters object to a transparent specification (see the following section).

    Creating an AlgorithmParameters Object

    As with all engine classes, the way to get an AlgorithmParameters object for a particular type of algorithm is to call the getInstance static factory method on the AlgorithmParameters class: 

    static AlgorithmParameters getInstance(String algorithm)
    Note: The algorithm name is not case-sensitive.
    A caller may optionally specify the name of a provider or the Provider class, which will guarantee that the algorithm parameter implementation requested is from the named provider: 
    static AlgorithmParameters getInstance(String algorithm, String provider)
static AlgorithmParameters getInstance(String algorithm, Provider provider)

    Initializing an AlgorithmParameters Object

    Once an AlgorithmParameters object is instantiated, it must be initialized via a call to init, using an appropriate parameter specification or parameter encoding: 

    void init(AlgorithmParameterSpec paramSpec) 
void init(byte[] params)
void init(byte[] params, String format)
    In these init methods, params is an array containing the encoded parameters, and format is the name of the decoding format. In the init method with a params argument but no format argument, the primary decoding format for parameters is used. The primary decoding format is ASN.1, if an ASN.1 specification for the parameters exists.
    Note: AlgorithmParameters objects can be initialized only once. They are not reusable.

    Obtaining the Encoded Parameters

    A byte encoding of the parameters represented in an AlgorithmParameters object may be obtained via a call to getEncoded: 

    byte[] getEncoded()
    This method returns the parameters in their primary encoding format. The primary encoding format for parameters is ASN.1, if an ASN.1 specification for this type of parameters exists.

    If you want the parameters returned in a specified encoding format, use 

    byte[] getEncoded(String format)
    If format is null, the primary encoding format for parameters is used, as in the other getEncoded method.
    Note: In the default AlgorithmParameters implementation, supplied by the "SUN" provider, the format argument is currently ignored.

    Converting an AlgorithmParameters Object to a Transparent Specification

    A transparent parameter specification for the algorithm parameters may be obtained from an AlgorithmParameters object via a call to getParameterSpec: 

    AlgorithmParameterSpec getParameterSpec(Class paramSpec)
    paramSpec identifies the specification class in which the parameters should be returned. The specification class could be, for example, DSAParameterSpec.class to indicate that the parameters should be returned in an instance of the DSAParameterSpec class. (This class is in the java.security.spec package.)

    The AlgorithmParameterGenerator Class

    The AlgorithmParameterGenerator class is an engine class used to generate a set of parameters suitable for a certain algorithm (the algorithm specified when an AlgorithmParameterGenerator instance is created).

    Creating an AlgorithmParameterGenerator Object

    As with all engine classes, the way to get an AlgorithmParameterGenerator object for a particular type of algorithm is to call the getInstance static factory method on the AlgorithmParameterGenerator class: 

    static AlgorithmParameterGenerator getInstance(
                                   String algorithm)
    Note: The algorithm name is not case-sensitive.

    A caller may optionally specify the name of a provider or the Provider class, which will guarantee that the algorithm parameter generator implementation is from the named provider: 

    static AlgorithmParameterGenerator getInstance(
                                   String algorithm, 
                                   String provider)

static AlgorithmParameterGenerator getInstance(
                                   String algorithm, 
                                   Provider provider)

    Initializing an AlgorithmParameterGenerator Object

    The AlgorithmParameterGenerator object can be initialized in two different ways: an algorithm-independent manner or an algorithm-specific manner.

    The algorithm-independent approach uses the fact that all parameter generators share the concept of a "size" and a source of randomness. The measure of size is universally shared by all algorithm parameters, though it is interpreted differently for different algorithms. For example, in the case of parameters for the DSA algorithm, "size" corresponds to the size of the prime modulus, in bits. (See Appendix B: Algorithms for information about the sizes for specific algorithms.) When using this approach, algorithm-specific parameter generation values--if any--default to some standard values. One init method that takes these two universally shared types of arguments: 

    void init(int size, SecureRandom random);
    Another init method takes only a size argument and uses a system-provided source of randomness: 
    void init(int size)

    A third approach initializes a parameter generator object using algorithm-specific semantics, which are represented by a set of algorithm-specific parameter generation values supplied in an AlgorithmParameterSpec object: 

    void init(AlgorithmParameterSpec genParamSpec,
                          SecureRandom random)

void init(AlgorithmParameterSpec genParamSpec)
    To generate Diffie-Hellman system parameters, for example, the parameter generation values usually consist of the size of the prime modulus and the size of the random exponent, both specified in number of bits. (The Diffie-Hellman algorithm has been part of the JCE since JCE 1.2.)

    Generating Algorithm Parameters

    Once you have created and initialized an AlgorithmParameterGenerator object, you can use the generateParameters method to generate the algorithm parameters: 
    AlgorithmParameters generateParameters()

    Key Interfaces

    The Key interface is the top-level interface for all opaque keys. It defines the functionality shared by all opaque key objects.

    An opaque key representation is one in which you have no direct access to the key material that constitutes a key. In other words: "opaque" gives you limited access to the key--just the three methods defined by the Key interface (see below): getAlgorithm, getFormat, and getEncoded. This is in contrast to a transparent representation, in which you can access each key material value individually, through one of the get methods defined in the corresponding specification class.

    All opaque keys have three characteristics:

    An Algorithm
    The key algorithm for that key. The key algorithm is usually an encryption or asymmetric operation algorithm (such as DSA or RSA), which will work with those algorithms and with related algorithms (such as MD5 with RSA, SHA-1 with RSA, etc.) The name of the algorithm of a key is obtained using this method: 
    String getAlgorithm()
    An Encoded Form
    The external encoded form for the key used when a standard representation of the key is needed outside the Java Virtual Machine, as when transmitting the key to some other party. The key is encoded according to a standard format (such as X.509 or PKCS #8), and is returned using the method: 

    byte[] getEncoded()
    A Format
    The name of the format of the encoded key. It is returned by the method: 
    String getFormat()
    Keys are generally obtained through key generators, certificates, key specifications (using a KeyFactory), or a KeyStore implementation accessing a keystore database used to manage keys.

    It is possible to parse encoded keys, in an algorithm-dependent manner, using a KeyFactory.

    It is also possible to parse certificates, using a CertificateFactory.

    Here is a list of interfaces which extend the Key interface in the java.security.interfaces package:

    The PublicKey and PrivateKey Interfaces

    The PublicKey and PrivateKey interfaces (which both extend the Key interface) are methodless interfaces, used for type-safety and type-identification.

    Key Specification Interfaces and Classes

    Key specifications are transparent representations of the key material that constitutes a key. If the key is stored on a hardware device, its specification may contain information that helps identify the key on the device.

    A transparent representation of keys means that you can access each key material value individually, through one of the get methods defined in the corresponding specification class. For example, DSAPrivateKeySpec defines getX, getP, getQ, and getG methods, to access the private key x, and the DSA algorithm parameters used to calculate the key: the prime p, the sub-prime q, and the base g.

    This representation is contrasted with an opaque representation, as defined by the Key interface, in which you have no direct access to the key material fields. In other words, an "opaque" representation gives you limited access to the key--just the three methods defined by the Key interface: getAlgorithm, getFormat, and getEncoded.

    A key may be specified in an algorithm-specific way, or in an algorithm-independent encoding format (such as ASN.1). For example, a DSA private key may be specified by its components x, p, q, and g (see DSAPrivateKeySpec), or it may be specified using its DER encoding (see PKCS8EncodedKeySpec).

    In the following sections, we discuss the key specification interfaces and classes in the java.security.spec package.

    The KeySpec Interface

    This interface contains no methods or constants. Its only purpose is to group and provide type safety for all key specifications. All key specifications must implement this interface.

    The DSAPrivateKeySpec Class

    This class (which implements the KeySpec interface) specifies a DSA private key with its associated parameters. DSAPrivateKeySpec has the following methods: 
    BigInteger getX()
BigInteger getP()
BigInteger getQ()
BigInteger getG()
    These methods return the private key x, and the DSA algorithm parameters used to calculate the key: the prime p, the sub-prime q, and the base g.

    The DSAPublicKeySpec Class

    This class (which implements the KeySpec interface) specifies a DSA public key with its associated parameters. DSAPublicKeySpec has the following methods: 
    BigInteger getY()
BigInteger getP()
BigInteger getQ()
BigInteger getG()
    These methods return the public key y, and the DSA algorithm parameters used to calculate the key: the prime p, the sub-prime q, and the base g.

    The RSAPrivateKeySpec Class

    This class (which implements the KeySpec interface) specifies an RSA private key. RSAPrivateKeySpec has the following methods: 
    BigInteger getModulus()
BigInteger getPrivateExponent()
    These methods return the RSA modulus n and private exponent d values that constitute the RSA private key.

    The RSAPrivateCrtKeySpec Class

    This class (which extends the RSAPrivateKeySpec class) specifies an RSA private key, as defined in the PKCS #1 standard, using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) information values. RSAPrivateCrtKeySpec has the following methods (in addition to the methods inherited from its superclass RSAPrivateKeySpec): 
    BigInteger getPublicExponent()
BigInteger getPrimeP()
BigInteger getPrimeQ()
BigInteger getPrimeExponentP()
BigInteger getPrimeExponentQ()
BigInteger getCrtCoefficient()
    These methods return the public exponent e and the CRT information integers: the prime factor p of the modulus n, the prime factor q of n, the exponent d mod (p-1), the exponent d mod (q-1), and the Chinese Remainder Theorem coefficient (inverse of q) mod p.

    An RSA private key logically consists of only the modulus and the private exponent. The presence of the CRT values is intended for efficiency.

    The RSAMultiPrimePrivateCrtKeySpec Class

    This class (which extends the RSAPrivateKeySpec class) specifies an RSA multi-prime private key, as defined in the PKCS#1 v2.1, using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) information values. RSAMultiPrimePrivateCrtKeySpec has the following methods (in addition to the methods inherited from its superclass RSAPrivateKeySpec): 
    BigInteger getPublicExponent()
BigInteger getPrimeP()
BigInteger getPrimeQ()
BigInteger getPrimeExponentP()
BigInteger getPrimeExponentQ()
BigInteger getCrtCoefficient()
RSAOtherPrimeInfo[] getOtherPrimeInfo()
    These methods return the public exponent e and the CRT information integers: the prime factor p of the modulus n, the prime factor q of n, the exponent d mod (p-1), the exponent d mod (q-1), and the Chinese Remainder Theorem coefficient (inverse of q) mod p.

    Method getOtherPrimeInfo returns a copy of the otherPrimeInfo (defined in PKCS#1 v 2.1) or null if there are only two prime factors (p and q).

    An RSA private key logically consists of only the modulus and the private exponent. The presence of the CRT values is intended for efficiency.

    The RSAPublicKeySpec Class

    This class (which implements the KeySpec interface) specifies an RSA public key. RSAPublicKeySpec has the following methods: 
    BigInteger getModulus()
BigInteger getPublicExponent()
    These methods return the RSA modulus n and public exponent e values that constitute the RSA public key.

    The EncodedKeySpec Class

    This abstract class (which implements the KeySpec interface) represents a public or private key in encoded format. Its getEncoded method returns the encoded key: 
    abstract byte[] getEncoded();
    and its getFormat method returns the name of the encoding format: 
    abstract String getFormat();

    See the next sections for the concrete implementations PKCS8EncodedKeySpec and X509EncodedKeySpec.

    The PKCS8EncodedKeySpec Class

    This class, which is a subclass of EncodedKeySpec, represents the DER encoding of a private key, according to the format specified in the PKCS #8 standard. Its getEncoded method returns the key bytes, encoded according to the PKCS #8 standard. Its getFormat method returns the string "PKCS#8".

    The X509EncodedKeySpec Class

    This class, which is a subclass of EncodedKeySpec, represents the DER encoding of a public key, according to the format specified in the X.509 standard. Its getEncoded method returns the key bytes, encoded according to the X.509 standard. Its getFormat method returns the string "X.509".

    The KeyFactory Class

    The KeyFactory class is an engine class designed to provide conversions between opaque cryptographic keys (of type Key) and key specifications (transparent representations of the underlying key material).

    Key factories are bi-directional. They allow you to build an opaque key object from a given key specification (key material), or to retrieve the underlying key material of a key object in a suitable format.

    Multiple compatible key specifications can exist for the same key. For example, a DSA public key may be specified by its components y, p, q, and g (see DSAPublicKeySpec), or it may be specified using its DER encoding according to the X.509 standard (see X509EncodedKeySpec).

    A key factory can be used to translate between compatible key specifications. Key parsing can be achieved through translation between compatible key specifications, e.g., when you translate from X509EncodedKeySpec to DSAPublicKeySpec, you basically parse the encoded key into its components. For an example, see the end of the Generating/Verifying Signatures Using Key Specifications and KeyFactory section.

    Creating a KeyFactory Object

    As with all engine classes, the way to get a KeyFactory object for a particular type of key algorithm is to call the getInstance static factory method on the KeyFactory class: 

    static KeyFactory getInstance(String algorithm)
    Note: The algorithm name is not case-sensitive.
    A caller may optionally specify the name of a provider or the Provider class, which will guarantee that the implementation of the key factory requested is from the named provider. 
    static KeyFactory getInstance(String algorithm, String provider)
static KeyFactory getInstance(String algorithm, Provider provider)

    Converting Between a Key Specification and a Key Object

    If you have a key specification for a public key, you can obtain an opaque PublicKey object from the specification by using the generatePublic method: 

    PublicKey generatePublic(KeySpec keySpec)

    Similarly, if you have a key specification for a private key, you can obtain an opaque PrivateKey object from the specification by using the generatePrivate method: 

    PrivateKey generatePrivate(KeySpec keySpec)

    Converting Between a Key Object and a Key Specification

    If you have a Key object, you can get a corresponding key specification object by calling the getKeySpec method: 

    KeySpec getKeySpec(Key key, Class keySpec)
    keySpec identifies the specification class in which the key material should be returned. It could, for example, be DSAPublicKeySpec.class, to indicate that the key material should be returned in an instance of the DSAPublicKeySpec class.

    Please see the Examples section for more details.

    The CertificateFactory Class

    The CertificateFactory class is an engine class that defines the functionality of a certificate factory, which is used to generate certificate and certificate revocation list (CRL) objects from their encodings.

    A certificate factory for X.509 must return certificates that are an instance of java.security.cert.X509Certificate, and CRLs that are an instance of java.security.cert.X509CRL.

    Creating a CertificateFactory Object

    As with all engine classes, the way to get a CertificateFactory object for a particular certificate or CRL type is to call the getInstance static factory method on the CertificateFactory class: 

    static CertificateFactory getInstance(String type)
    Note: The type name is not case-sensitive.
    A caller may optionally specify the name of a provider or the Provider class, which will guarantee that the implementation of the certificate factory requested is from the named provider. 
    static CertificateFactory getInstance(String type, String provider)

static CertificateFactory getInstance(String type, Provider provider)

    Generating Certificate Objects

    To generate a certificate object and initialize it with the data read from an input stream, use the generateCertificate method: 
    final Certificate generateCertificate(InputStream inStream)
    To return a (possibly empty) collection view of the certificates read from a given input stream, use the generateCertificates method: 
    final Collection generateCertificates(InputStream inStream)

    Generating CRL Objects

    To generate a certificate revocation list (CRL) object and initialize it with the data read from an input stream, use the generateCRL method: 
    final CRL generateCRL(InputStream inStream)
    To return a (possibly empty) collection view of the CRLs read from a given input stream, use the generateCRLs method: 
    final Collection generateCRLs(InputStream inStream)

    Generating CertPath Objects

    To generate a CertPath object and initialize it with data read from an input stream, use one of the following generateCertPath methods (with or without specifying the encoding to be used for the data): 
    final CertPath generateCertPath(InputStream inStream)

final CertPath generateCertPath(InputStream inStream, 
                                String encoding)
    To generate a CertPath object and initialize it with a list of certificates, use the following method: 
    final CertPath generateCertPath(List certificates)
    To retrieve a list of the CertPath encodings supported by this certificate factory, you can call the getCertPathEncodings method: 
    final Iterator getCertPathEncodings()
    The default encoding will be listed first.

    The KeyPair Class

    The KeyPair class is a simple holder for a key pair (a public key and a private key). It has two public methods, one for returning the private key, and the other for returning the public key: 

    PrivateKey getPrivate()
PublicKey getPublic()

    The KeyPairGenerator Class

    The KeyPairGenerator class is an engine class used to generate pairs of public and private keys.

    There are two ways to generate a key pair: in an algorithm-independent manner, and in an algorithm-specific manner. The only difference between the two is the initialization of the object.

    Please see the Examples section for examples of calls to the methods documented below.

    Creating a KeyPairGenerator

    All key pair generation starts with a KeyPairGenerator. This generation is done using one of the factory methods on KeyPairGenerator: 

    static KeyPairGenerator getInstance(String algorithm)
static KeyPairGenerator getInstance(String algorithm, 
                                    String provider)
static KeyPairGenerator getInstance(String algorithm, 
                                    Provider provider)
    Note: The algorithm name is not case-sensitive.

    Initializing a KeyPairGenerator

    A key pair generator for a particular algorithm creates a public/private key pair that can be used with this algorithm. It also associates algorithm-specific parameters with each of the generated keys.

    A key pair generator needs to be initialized before it can generate keys. In most cases, algorithm-independent initialization is sufficient. But in other cases, algorithm-specific initialization is used.

    Algorithm-Independent Initialization

    All key pair generators share the concepts of a keysize and a source of randomness. The keysize is interpreted differently for different algorithms. For example, in the case of the DSA algorithm, the keysize corresponds to the length of the modulus. (See Appendix B: Algorithms for information about the keysizes for specific algorithms.)

    An initialize method takes two universally shared types of arguments: 

    void initialize(int keysize, SecureRandom random)
    Another initialize method takes only a keysize argument; it uses a system-provided source of randomness: 
    void initialize(int keysize)

    Since no other parameters are specified when you call the above algorithm-independent initialize methods, it is up to the provider what to do about the algorithm-specific parameters (if any) to be associated with each of the keys.

    If the algorithm is a "DSA" algorithm, and the modulus size (keysize) is 512, 768, or 1024, then the "SUN" provider uses a set of precomputed values for the p, q, and g parameters. If the modulus size is not one of the above values, the "SUN" provider creates a new set of parameters. Other providers might have precomputed parameter sets for more than just the three modulus sizes mentioned above. Still others might not have a list of precomputed parameters at all and instead always create new parameter sets.

    Algorithm-Specific Initialization

    For situations where a set of algorithm-specific parameters already exists (such as "community parameters" in DSA), there are two initialize methods that have an AlgorithmParameterSpec argument. One also has a SecureRandom argument, while the source of randomness is system-provided for the other: 

    void initialize(AlgorithmParameterSpec params,
                SecureRandom random)

void initialize(AlgorithmParameterSpec params)
    See the Examples section for more details.

    Generating a Key Pair

    The procedure for generating a key pair is always the same, regardless of initialization (and of the algorithm). You always call the following method from KeyPairGenerator: 

    KeyPair generateKeyPair()
    Multiple calls to generateKeyPair will yield different key pairs.

    Key Management

    A database called a "keystore" can be used to manage a repository of keys and certificates. (A certificate is a digitally signed statement from one entity, saying that the public key of some other entity has a particular value.)

    Keystore Location

    The keystore is by default stored in a file named .keystore in the user's home directory, as determined by the "user.home" system property. On Solaris systems "user.home" defaults to the user's home directory. On Win32 systems, given user name uName, "user.home" defaults to:

    • C:\Winnt\Profiles\uName on multi-user Windows NT systems
    • C:\Windows\Profiles\uName on multi-user Windows 95/98/2000 systems
    • C:\Windows on single-user Windows 95/98/2000 systems

    Keystore Implementation

    The KeyStore class supplies well-defined interfaces to access and modify the information in a keystore. It is possible for there to be multiple different concrete implementations, where each implementation is that for a particular type of keystore.

    Currently, there are two command-line tools that make use of KeyStore: keytool and jarsigner, and also a GUI-based tool named policytool. It is also used by the Policy reference implementation when it processes policy files specifying the permissions (allowed accesses to system resources) to be granted to code from various sources. Since KeyStore is publicly available, SDK users can write additional security applications that use it.

    There is a built-in default implementation, provided by Sun Microsystems. It implements the keystore as a file, utilizing a proprietary keystore type (format) named "JKS". It protects each private key with its individual password, and also protects the integrity of the entire keystore with a (possibly different) password.

    Keystore implementations are provider-based. More specifically, the application interfaces supplied by KeyStore are implemented in terms of a "Service Provider Interface" (SPI). That is, there is a corresponding abstract KeystoreSpi class, also in the java.security package, which defines the SPI methods that "providers" must implement. (The term "provider" refers to a package or a set of packages that supply a concrete implementation of a subset of services that can be accessed by the Java 2 SDK Security API.) Therefore, to provide a keystore implementation clients must implement a "provider" and supply a KeystoreSpi subclass implementation, as described in How to Implement a Provider for the Java Cryptography Architecture.

    Applications can choose different types of keystore implementations from different providers, using the getInstance factory method in the KeyStore class. A keystore type defines the storage and data format of the keystore information, and the algorithms used to protect private keys in the keystore and the integrity of the keystore itself. Keystore implementations of different types are not compatible.

    The default keystore type is "jks" (the proprietary type of the keystore implementation provided by the "SUN" provider). This is specified by the following line in the security properties file: 

    keystore.type=jks
    To have tools and other applications use a keystore implementation other than the default keystore, you can change that line to specify a different keystore type. Another solution would be to let users of your tools and applications specify a keystore type, and pass that value to the getInstance method of KeyStore.

    An example of the former approach is the following: If you have a provider package that supplies a keystore implementation for a keystore type called pkcs12, change the line to 

    keystore.type=pkcs12
    Note: Keystore type designations are not case-sensitive. For example, "JKS" would be considered the same as "jks".

    The KeyStore Class

    The KeyStore class is an engine class that supplies well-defined interfaces to access and modify the information in a keystore.

    This class represents an in-memory collection of keys and certificates. KeyStore manages two types of entries:

    Key Entry

    This type of keystore entry holds very sensitive cryptographic key information, which is stored in a protected format to prevent unauthorized access. Typically, a key stored in this type of entry is a secret key, or a private key accompanied by the certificate chain authenticating the corresponding public key.

    Private keys and certificate chains are used by a given entity for self-authentication using digital signatures. For example, software distribution organizations digitally sign JAR files as part of releasing and/or licensing software.

    Trusted Certificate Entry

    This type of entry contains a single public key certificate belonging to another party. It is called a trusted certificate because the keystore owner trusts that the public key in the certificate indeed belongs to the identity identified by the subject (owner) of the certificate.

    This type of entry can be used to authenticate other parties.

    Each entry in a keystore is identified by an "alias" string. In the case of private keys and their associated certificate chains, these strings distinguish among the different ways in which the entity may authenticate itself. For example, the entity may authenticate itself using different certificate authorities, or using different public key algorithms.

    Whether keystores are persistent, and the mechanisms used by the keystore if it is persistent, are not specified here. This convention allows use of a variety of techniques for protecting sensitive (e.g., private or secret) keys. Smart cards or other integrated cryptographic engines (SafeKeyper) are one option, and simpler mechanisms such as files may also be used (in a variety of formats).

    The main KeyStore methods are described below.

    Creating a KeyStore Object

    As with all engine classes, the way to get a KeyStore object is to call the getInstance static factory method on the KeyStore class: 

    static KeyStore getInstance(String type)

    A caller may optionally specify the name of a provider or the Provider class, which will guarantee that the implementation of the type requested is from the named provider: 

    static KeyStore getInstance(String type, String provider)
static KeyStore getInstance(String type, Provider provider)

    Loading a Particular Keystore into Memory

    Before a KeyStore object can be used, the actual keystore data must be loaded into memory via the load method: 
    final void load(InputStream stream, char[] password)
    The optional password is used to check the integrity of the keystore data. If no password is supplied, no integrity check is performed.

    To create an empty keystore, you pass null as the InputStream argument to the load method.

    Getting a List of the Keystore Aliases

    All keystore entries are accessed via unique aliases. The aliases method returns an enumeration of the alias names in the keystore: 

    final Enumeration aliases()

    Determining Keystore Entry Types

    As stated in The KeyStore Class, there are two different types of entries in a keystore.

    The following methods determine whether the entry specified by the given alias is a key/certificate or a trusted certificate entry, respectively: 

    final boolean isKeyEntry(String alias)
final boolean isCertificateEntry(String alias)

    Adding/Setting/Deleting Keystore Entries

    The setCertificateEntry method assigns a certificate to a specified alias: 
    final void setCertificateEntry(String alias, Certificate cert)
    If alias doesn't exist, a trusted certificate entry with that alias is created. If alias exists and identifies a trusted certificate entry, the certificate associated with it is replaced by cert.

    The setKeyEntry methods add (if alias doesn't yet exist) or set key entries: 

    final void setKeyEntry(String alias,
                       Key key, 
                       char[] password,
                       Certificate[] chain)

final void setKeyEntry(String alias,
                       byte[] key,
                       Certificate[] chain)
    In the method with key as a byte array, it is the bytes for a key in protected format. For example, in the keystore implementation supplied by the "SUN" provider, the key byte array is expected to contain a protected private key, encoded as an EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo as defined in the PKCS #8 standard. In the other method, the password is the password used to protect the key.

    The deleteEntry method deletes an entry: 

    final void deleteEntry(String alias)

    Getting Information from the Keystore

    The getKey method returns the key associated with the given alias. The key is recovered using the given password: 
    final Key getKey(String alias, char[] password)
    The following methods return the certificate, or certificate chain, respectively, associated with the given alias: 
    final Certificate getCertificate(String alias)
final Certificate[] getCertificateChain(String alias)
    You can determine the name (alias) of the first entry whose certificate matches a given certificate via the following: 
    final String getCertificateAlias(Certificate cert)

    Saving the KeyStore

    The in-memory keystore can be saved via the store method: 
    final void store(OutputStream stream, char[] password)
    The password is used to calculate an integrity checksum of the keystore data, which is appended to the keystore data.

    The SecureRandom Class

    The SecureRandom class is an engine class that provides the functionality of a random number generator.

    Creating a SecureRandom Object

    As with all engine classes, the way to get a SecureRandom object is to call the getInstance static factory method on the SecureRandom class: 

    static SecureRandom getInstance(String algorithm)

    A caller may optionally specify the name of a provider or the Provider class, which will guarantee that the implementation of the random number generation (RNG) algorithm requested is from the named provider: 

    static final SecureRandom getInstance(String algorithm,
                                      String provider)
static final SecureRandom getInstance(String algorithm,
                                      Provider provider)

    Seeding or Re-Seeding the SecureRandom Object

    The SecureRandom implementation attempts to completely randomize the internal state of the generator itself unless the caller follows the call to a getInstance method with a call to one of the setSeed methods: 

    synchronized public void setSeed(byte[] seed)
public void setSeed(long seed)
    Once the SecureRandom object has been seeded, it will produce bits as random as the original seeds.

    At any time a SecureRandom object may be re-seeded using one of the setSeed methods. The given seed supplements, rather than replaces, the existing seed; therefore, repeated calls are guaranteed never to reduce randomness.

    Using a SecureRandom Object

    To get random bytes, a caller simply passes an array of any length, which is then filled with random bytes: 

    synchronized public void nextBytes(byte[] bytes)

    Generating Seed Bytes

    If desired, it is possible to invoke the generateSeed method to generate a given number of seed bytes (to seed other random number generators, for example): 
    byte[] generateSeed(int numBytes)

    How to Make Applications "Exempt" from Cryptographic Restrictions

    [Note 1: This section should be ignored by most application developers. It is only for people whose applications may be exported to those few countries whose governments mandate cryptographic restrictions, if it desired that such applications have fewer cryptographic restrictions than those mandated.

    [Note 2: Throughout this section, the term "application" is meant to encompass both applications and applets.]

    The JCE framework within J2SE 5 includes an ability to enforce restrictions regarding the cryptographic algorithms and maximum cryptographic strengths available to applets/applications in different jurisdiction contexts (locations). Any such restrictions are specified in "jurisdiction policy files".

    Due to import control restrictions by the governments of a few countries, the jurisdiction policy files shipped with the J2SE 5 development kit from Sun Microsystems specify that "strong" but limited cryptography may be used. An "unlimited strength" version of these files indicating no restrictions on cryptographic strengths is available for those living in eligible countries (which is most countries). But only the "strong" version can be imported into those countries whose governments mandate restrictions. The JCE framework will enforce the restrictions specified in the installed jurisdiction policy files.

    It is possible that the governments of some or all such countries may allow certain applications to become exempt from some or all cryptographic restrictions. For example, they may consider certain types of applications as "special" and thus exempt. Or they may exempt any application that utilizes an "exemption mechanism," such as key recovery. Applications deemed to be exempt could get access to stronger cryptography than that allowed for non-exempt applications in such countries.

    In order for an application to be recognized as "exempt" at runtime, it must meet the following conditions:

    Below are sample steps required in order to make an application exempt from some or all cryptographic restrictions. This is a basic outline that includes information about what is required by JCE in order to recognize and treat applications as being exempt. You will need to know the exemption requirements of the particular country or countries in which you would like your application to be able to be run but whose governments require cryptographic restrictions. You will also need to know the requirements of a JCE framework vendor that has a process in place for handling exempt applications. Consult such a vendor for further information. (Note: The SunJCE provider does not supply an implementation of the ExemptionMechanismSpi class.)


    Special Code Requirements for Applications that Use Exemption Mechanisms

    When an application has a permission policy file associated with it (in the same JAR file) and that permission policy file specifies an exemption mechanism, then when the Cipher getInstance method is called to instantiate a Cipher, the JCE code searches the installed providers for one that implements the specified exemption mechanism. If it finds such a provider, JCE instantiates an ExemptionMechanism API object associated with the provider's implementation, and then associates the ExemptionMechanism object with the Cipher returned by getInstance.

    After instantiating a Cipher, and prior to initializing it (via a call to the Cipher init method), your code must call the following Cipher method: 

        public ExemptionMechanism getExemptionMechanism()

    This call returns the ExemptionMechanism object associated with the Cipher. You must then initialize the exemption mechanism implementation by calling the following method on the returned ExemptionMechanism: 

         public final void init(Key key)

    The argument you supply should be the same as the argument of the same types that you will subsequently supply to a Cipher init method.

    Once you have initialized the ExemptionMechanism, you can proceed as usual to initialize and use the Cipher.

    Permission Policy Files

    In order for an application to be recognized at runtime as being "exempt" from some or all cryptographic restrictions, it must have a permission policy file bundled with it in a JAR file. The permission policy file specifies what cryptography-related permissions the application has, and under what conditions (if any).

    Note: The permission policy file bundled with an application must be named cryptoPerms.

    The format of a permission entry in a permission policy file that accompanies an exempt application is the same as the format for a jurisdiction policy file downloaded with the JDK, which is: 

    permission <crypto permission class name>[ <alg_name>
        [[, <exemption mechanism name>][, <maxKeySize>
        [, <AlgorithmParameterSpec class name>,
        <parameters for constructing an AlgorithmParameterSpec object>]]]];

    See Appendix D for more information about the jurisdiction policy file format.

    Permission Policy Files for Exempt Applications

    Some applications may be allowed to be completely unrestricted. Thus, the permission policy file that accompanies such an application usually just needs to contain the following: 

    grant {
        // There are no restrictions to any algorithms.
        permission javax.crypto.CryptoAllPermission;
    };

    If an application just uses a single algorithm (or several specific algorithms), then the permission policy file could simply mention that algorithm (or algorithms) explicitly, rather than granting CryptoAllPermission. For example, if an application just uses the Blowfish algorithm, the permission policy file doesn't have to grant CryptoAllPermission to all algorithms. It could just specify that there is no cryptographic restriction if the Blowfish algorithm is used. In order to do this, the permission policy file would look like the following: 

    grant {
        permission javax.crypto.CryptoPermission "Blowfish";
    };

    Permission Policy Files for Applications Exempt Due to Exemption Mechanisms

    If an application is considered "exempt" if an exemption mechanism is enforced, then the permission policy file that accompanies the application must specify one or more exemption mechanisms. At runtime, the application will be considered exempt if any of those exemption mechanisms is enforced. Each exemption mechanism must be specified in a permission entry that looks like the following: 

        // No algorithm restrictions if specified
        // exemption mechanism is enforced.
        permission javax.crypto.CryptoPermission *, 
            "<ExemptionMechanismName>";

    where <ExemptionMechanismName> specifies the name of an exemption mechanism. The list of possible exemption mechanism names includes:

    • KeyRecovery

    • KeyEscrow

    • KeyWeakening
    As an example, suppose your application is exempt if either key recovery or key escrow is enforced. Then your permission policy file should contain the following: 
    grant {
        // No algorithm restrictions if KeyRecovery is enforced.
        permission javax.crypto.CryptoPermission *, 
            "KeyRecovery";
        // No algorithm restrictions if KeyEscrow is enforced.
        permission javax.crypto.CryptoPermission *, 
            "KeyEscrow";
    };

    Note: Permission entries that specify exemption mechanisms should not also specify maximum key sizes. The allowed key sizes are actually determined from the installed exempt jurisdiction policy files, as described in the next section.

    How Bundled Permission Policy Files Affect Cryptographic Permissions

    At runtime, when an application instantiates a Cipher (via a call to its getInstance method) and that application has an associated permission policy file, JCE checks to see whether the permission policy file has an entry that applies to the algorithm specified in the getInstance call. If it does, and the entry grants CryptoAllPermission or does not specify that an exemption mechanism must be enforced, it means there is no cryptographic restriction for this particular algorithm.

    If the permission policy file has an entry that applies to the algorithm specified in the getInstance call and the entry does specify that an exemption mechanism must be enforced, then the exempt jurisdiction policy file(s) are examined. If the exempt permissions include an entry for the relevant algorithm and exemption mechanism, and that entry is implied by the permissions in the permission policy file bundled with the application, and if there is an implementation of the specified exemption mechanism available from one of the registered providers, then the maximum key size and algorithm parameter values for the Cipher are determined from the exempt permission entry.

    If there is no exempt permission entry implied by the relevant entry in the permission policy file bundled with the application, or if there is no implementation of the specified exemption mechanism available from any of the registered providers, then the application is only allowed the standard default cryptographic permissions.

    Code Examples

    Computing a MessageDigest Object

    First create the message digest object, as in the following example: 

    MessageDigest sha = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-1");
    This call assigns a properly initialized message digest object to the sha variable. The implementation implements the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1), as defined in the National Institute for Standards and Technology's (NIST) FIPS 180-1 document. See Appendix A for a complete discussion of standard names and algorithms.

    Next, suppose we have three byte arrays, i1, i2 and i3, which form the total input whose message digest we want to compute. This digest (or "hash") could be calculated via the following calls: 

    sha.update(i1);
sha.update(i2);
sha.update(i3);
byte[] hash = sha.digest();

    An equivalent alternative series of calls would be: 

    sha.update(i1);
sha.update(i2);
byte[] hash = sha.digest(i3);
    After the message digest has been calculated, the message digest object is automatically reset and ready to receive new data and calculate its digest. All former state (i.e., the data supplied to update calls) is lost.

    Some hash implementations may support intermediate hashes through cloning. Suppose we want to calculate separate hashes for:

    A way to do it is: 

    /* compute the hash for i1 */
sha.update(i1); 
byte[] i1Hash = sha.clone().digest();

/* compute the hash for i1 and i2 */
sha.update(i2); 
byte[] i12Hash = sha.clone().digest(); 

/* compute the hash for i1, i2 and i3 */
sha.update(i3); 
byte[] i123hash = sha.digest();
    This code works only if the SHA-1 implementation is cloneable. While some implementations of message digests are cloneable, others are not. To determine whether or not cloning is possible, attempt to clone the MessageDigest object and catch the potential exception as follows: 
    try {
    // try and clone it
    /* compute the hash for i1 */
    sha.update(i1); 
    byte[] i1Hash = sha.clone().digest();
    . . .
    byte[] i123hash = sha.digest();
} catch (CloneNotSupportedException cnse) {
    // do something else, such as the code shown below
}
    If a message digest is not cloneable, the other, less elegant way to compute intermediate digests is to create several digests. In this case, the number of intermediate digests to be computed must be known in advance: 
    MessageDigest sha1 = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-1");
MessageDigest sha12 = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-1"); 
MessageDigest sha123 = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-1");

byte[] i1Hash = sha1.digest(i1);

sha12.update(i1);
byte[] i12Hash = sha12.digest(i2);

sha123.update(i1);
sha123.update(i2);
byte[] i123Hash = sha123.digest(i3);

    Generating a Pair of Keys

    In this example we will generate a public-private key pair for the algorithm named "DSA" (Digital Signature Algorithm). We will generate keys with a 1024-bit modulus, using a user-derived seed, called userSeed. We don't care which provider supplies the algorithm implementation.

    Creating the Key Pair Generator

    The first step is to get a key pair generator object for generating keys for the DSA algorithm: 

    KeyPairGenerator keyGen = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("DSA");

    Initializing the Key Pair Generator

    The next step is to initialize the key pair generator. In most cases, algorithm-independent initialization is sufficient, but in some cases, algorithm-specific initialization is used.
    Algorithm-Independent Initialization

    All key pair generators share the concepts of a keysize and a source of randomness. A KeyPairGenerator class initialize method has these two types of arguments. Thus, to generate keys with a keysize of 1024 and a new SecureRandom object seeded by the userSeed value, you can use the following code: 

    SecureRandom random = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG", "SUN");
random.setSeed(userSeed);
keyGen.initialize(1024, random);
    Since no other parameters are specified when you call the above algorithm-independent initialize method, it is up to the provider what to do about the algorithm-specific parameters (if any) to be associated with each of the keys. The provider may use precomputed parameter values or may generate new values.
    Algorithm-Specific Initialization

    For situations where a set of algorithm-specific parameters already exists (such as "community parameters" in DSA), there are two initialize methods that have an AlgorithmParameterSpec argument. Suppose your key pair generator is for the "DSA" algorithm, and you have a set of DSA-specific parameters, p, q, and g, that you would like to use to generate your key pair. You could execute the following code to initialize your key pair generator (recall that DSAParameterSpec is an AlgorithmParameterSpec): 

    DSAParameterSpec dsaSpec = new DSAParameterSpec(p, q, g);
SecureRandom random = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG", "SUN");
random.setSeed(userSeed);
keyGen.initialize(dsaSpec, random);
    Note: The parameter named p is a prime number whose length is the modulus length ("size"). Therefore, you don't need to call any other method to specify the modulus length.

    Generating the Pair of Keys

    The final step is generating the key pair. No matter which type of initialization was used (algorithm-independent or algorithm-specific), the same code is used to generate the key pair: 
    KeyPair pair = keyGen.generateKeyPair();

    Generating and Verifying a Signature Using Generated Keys

    The following signature generation and verification examples use the key pair generated in the key pair example above.

    Generating a Signature

    We first create a signature object: 

    Signature dsa = Signature.getInstance("SHA1withDSA");
    Next, using the key pair generated in the key pair example, we initialize the object with the private key, then sign a byte array called data. 
    /* Initializing the object with a private key */
PrivateKey priv = pair.getPrivate();
dsa.initSign(priv);

/* Update and sign the data */
dsa.update(data);
byte[] sig = dsa.sign();

    Verifying a Signature

    Verifying the signature is straightforward. (Note that here we also use the key pair generated in the key pair example.) 
    /* Initializing the object with the public key */
PublicKey pub = pair.getPublic();
dsa.initVerify(pub);

/* Update and verify the data */
dsa.update(data);
boolean verifies = dsa.verify(sig);
System.out.println("signature verifies: " + verifies);

    Generating/Verifying Signatures Using Key Specifications and KeyFactory

    Suppose that, rather than having a public/private key pair (as, for example, was generated in the key pair example above), you simply have the components of your DSA private key: x (the private key), p (the prime), q (the sub-prime), and g (the base).

    Further suppose you want to use your private key to digitally sign some data, which is in a byte array named someData. You would do the following steps, which also illustrate creating a key specification and using a key factory to obtain a PrivateKey from the key specification (initSign requires a PrivateKey): 

    DSAPrivateKeySpec dsaPrivKeySpec = new DSAPrivateKeySpec(x, p, q, g);

KeyFactory keyFactory = KeyFactory.getInstance("DSA");
PrivateKey privKey = keyFactory.generatePrivate(dsaPrivKeySpec);

Signature sig = Signature.getInstance("SHA1withDSA");
sig.initSign(privKey);
sig.update(someData);
byte[] signature = sig.sign();
    Suppose Alice wants to use the data you signed. In order for her to do so, and to verify your signature, you need to send her three things:
    1. the data,
    2. the signature, and
    3. the public key corresponding to the private key you used to sign the data.
    You can store the someData bytes in one file, and the signature bytes in another, and send those to Alice.

    For the public key, assume, as in the signing example above, you have the components of the DSA public key corresponding to the DSA private key used to sign the data. Then you can create a DSAPublicKeySpec from those components: 

    DSAPublicKeySpec dsaPubKeySpec = new DSAPublicKeySpec(y, p, q, g);
    You still need to extract the key bytes so that you can put them in a file. To do so, you can first call the generatePublic method on the DSA key factory already created in the example above: 
    PublicKey pubKey = keyFactory.generatePublic(dsaPubKeySpec);
    Then you can extract the (encoded) key bytes via the following: 
    byte[] encKey = pubKey.getEncoded();
    You can now store these bytes in a file, and send it to Alice along with the files containing the data and the signature.

    Now, assume Alice has received these files, and she copied the data bytes from the data file to a byte array named data, the signature bytes from the signature file to a byte array named signature, and the encoded public key bytes from the public key file to a byte array named encodedPubKey.

    Alice can now execute the following code to verify the signature. The code also illustrates how to use a key factory in order to instantiate a DSA public key from its encoding (initVerify requires a PublicKey). 

        X509EncodedKeySpec pubKeySpec = new X509EncodedKeySpec(encodedPubKey);

    KeyFactory keyFactory = KeyFactory.getInstance("DSA");
    PublicKey pubKey = keyFactory.generatePublic(pubKeySpec);

    Signature sig = Signature.getInstance("SHA1withDSA");
    sig.initVerify(pubKey);
    sig.update(data);
    sig.verify(signature);
    Note: In the above, Alice needed to generate a PublicKey from the encoded key bits, since initVerify requires a PublicKey. Once she has a PublicKey, she could also use the KeyFactory getKeySpec method to convert it to a DSAPublicKeySpec so that she can access the components, if desired, as in: 
        DSAPublicKeySpec dsaPubKeySpec =
        (DSAPublicKeySpec)keyFactory.getKeySpec(pubKey,
            DSAPublicKeySpec.class)
    Now she can access the DSA public key components y, p, q, and g through the corresponding "get" methods on the DSAPublicKeySpec class (getY, getP, getQ, and getG).

    Determining If Two Keys Are Equal

    In many cases you would like to know if two keys are equal; however, the default method java.lang.Object.equals may not give the desired result. The most provider-independent approach is to compare the encoded keys. If this comparison isn't appropriate (for example, when comparing an RSAPrivateKey and an RSAPrivateCrtKey), you should compare each component. The following code demonstrates this idea: 

    static boolean keysEqual(Key key1, Key key2) {
    if (key1.equals(key2)) {
        return true;
    }
 
    if (Arrays.equals(key1.getEncoded(), key2.getEncoded())) {
        return true;
    }

    // More code for different types of keys here.
    // For example, the following code can check if
    // an RSAPrivateKey and an RSAPrivateCrtKey are equal:
    // if ((key1 instanceof RSAPrivateKey) &&
    //     (key2 instanceof RSAPrivateKey)) {
    //     if ((key1.getModulus().equals(key2.getModulus())) &&
    //         (key1.getPrivateExponent().equals(
    //                                      key2.getPrivateExponent()))) {
    //         return true;
    //     }
    // }

    return false;
}

    Reading Base64-Encoded Certificates

    The following example reads a file with Base64-encoded certificates, which are each bounded at the beginning by 

    -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
    and at the end by 
    -----END CERTIFICATE-----
    We convert the FileInputStream (which does not support mark and reset) to a ByteArrayInputStream (which supports those methods), so that each call to generateCertificate consumes only one certificate, and the read position of the input stream is positioned to the next certificate in the file:

    FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(filename);
BufferedInputStream bis = new BufferedInputStream(fis);

CertificateFactory cf = CertificateFactory.getInstance("X.509");

while (bis.available() > 0) {
    Certificate cert = cf.generateCertificate(bis);
    System.out.println(cert.toString());
}

    Parsing a Certificate Reply

    The following example parses a PKCS #7-formatted certificate reply stored in a file and extracts all the certificates from it:

    FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(filename);
CertificateFactory cf = CertificateFactory.getInstance("X.509");
Collection c = cf.generateCertificates(fis);
Iterator i = c.iterator();
while (i.hasNext()) {
   Certificate cert = (Certificate)i.next();
   System.out.println(cert);
}

    This section is a short tutorial on how to use some of the major features of the JCE APIs in J2SE 5. Complete sample programs that exercise the APIs can be found in Appendix F of this document.

    Using Encryption

    This section takes the user through the process of generating a key, creating and initializing a cipher object, encrypting a file, and then decrypting it. Throughout this example, we use the Data Encryption Standard (DES).

    Generating a Key

    To create a DES key, we have to instantiate a KeyGenerator for DES. We do not specify a provider, because we do not care about a particular DES key generation implementation. Since we do not initialize the KeyGenerator, a system-provided source of randomness will be used to create the DES key: 

        KeyGenerator keygen = KeyGenerator.getInstance("DES");
        SecretKey desKey = keygen.generateKey();

    After the key has been generated, the same KeyGenerator object can be re-used to create further keys.

    Creating a Cipher

    The next step is to create a Cipher instance. To do this, we use one of the getInstance factory methods of the Cipher class. We must specify the name of the requested transformation, which includes the following components, separated by slashes (/):

    • the algorithm name
    • the mode (optional)
    • the padding scheme (optional)

    In this example, we create a DES (Data Encryption Standard) cipher in Electronic Codebook mode, with PKCS #5-style padding. We do not specify a provider, because we do not care about a particular implementation of the requested transformation.

    The standard algorithm name for DES is "DES", the standard name for the Electronic Codebook mode is "ECB", and the standard name for PKCS #5-style padding is "PKCS5Padding": 

        Cipher desCipher;

        // Create the cipher 
        desCipher = Cipher.getInstance("DES/ECB/PKCS5Padding");

    We use the generated desKey from above to initialize the Cipher object for encryption: 

        // Initialize the cipher for encryption
        desCipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, desKey);

        // Our cleartext
        byte[] cleartext = "This is just an example".getBytes();

        // Encrypt the cleartext
        byte[] ciphertext = desCipher.doFinal(cleartext);

        // Initialize the same cipher for decryption
        desCipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, desKey);

        // Decrypt the ciphertext
        byte[] cleartext1 = desCipher.doFinal(ciphertext);

    cleartext and cleartext1 are identical.

    Using Password-Based Encryption

    In this example, we prompt the user for a password from which we derive an encryption key.

    It would seem logical to collect and store the password in an object of type java.lang.String. However, here's the caveat: Objects of type String are immutable, i.e., there are no methods defined that allow you to change (overwrite) or zero out the contents of a String after usage. This feature makes String objects unsuitable for storing security sensitive information such as user passwords. You should always collect and store security sensitive information in a char array instead.

    For that reason, the javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec class takes (and returns) a password as a char array.

    The following method is an example of how to collect a user password as a char array: 

        /**
         * Reads user password from given input stream.
         */
        public char[] readPasswd(InputStream in) throws IOException {
            char[] lineBuffer;
            char[] buf;
            int i;

            buf = lineBuffer = new char[128];

            int room = buf.length;
            int offset = 0;
            int c;

    loop:   while (true) {
                switch (c = in.read()) {
                  case -1: 
                  case '\n':
                    break loop;

                  case '\r':
                    int c2 = in.read();
                    if ((c2 != '\n') && (c2 != -1)) {
                        if (!(in instanceof PushbackInputStream)) {
                            in = new PushbackInputStream(in);
                        }
                        ((PushbackInputStream)in).unread(c2);
                    } else 
                        break loop;

                  default:
                    if (--room < 0) {
                        buf = new char[offset + 128];
                        room = buf.length - offset - 1;
                        System.arraycopy(lineBuffer, 0, buf, 0, offset);
                        Arrays.fill(lineBuffer, ' ');
                        lineBuffer = buf;
                    }
                    buf[offset++] = (char) c;
                    break;
                }
            }

            if (offset == 0) {
                return null;
            }

            char[] ret = new char[offset];
            System.arraycopy(buf, 0, ret, 0, offset);
            Arrays.fill(buf, ' ');

            return ret;
        }

    In order to use Password-Based Encryption (PBE) as defined in PKCS #5, we have to specify a salt and an iteration count. The same salt and iteration count that are used for encryption must be used for decryption: 

        PBEKeySpec pbeKeySpec;
        PBEParameterSpec pbeParamSpec;
        SecretKeyFactory keyFac;

        // Salt
        byte[] salt = {
            (byte)0xc7, (byte)0x73, (byte)0x21, (byte)0x8c,
            (byte)0x7e, (byte)0xc8, (byte)0xee, (byte)0x99
        };

        // Iteration count
        int count = 20;

        // Create PBE parameter set
        pbeParamSpec = new PBEParameterSpec(salt, count);

        // Prompt user for encryption password.
        // Collect user password as char array (using the
        // "readPasswd" method from above), and convert
        // it into a SecretKey object, using a PBE key
        // factory.
        System.out.print("Enter encryption password:  ");
        System.out.flush();
        pbeKeySpec = new PBEKeySpec(readPasswd(System.in));
        keyFac = SecretKeyFactory.getInstance("PBEWithMD5AndDES");
        SecretKey pbeKey = keyFac.generateSecret(pbeKeySpec);

        // Create PBE Cipher
        Cipher pbeCipher = Cipher.getInstance("PBEWithMD5AndDES");

        // Initialize PBE Cipher with key and parameters
        pbeCipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, pbeKey, pbeParamSpec);

        // Our cleartext
        byte[] cleartext = "This is another example".getBytes();

        // Encrypt the cleartext
        byte[] ciphertext = pbeCipher.doFinal(cleartext);

    Using Key Agreement

    Please refer to Appendix F for sample programs exercising the Diffie-Hellman key exchange between 2 and 3 parties, respectively.

    Appendix A: Standard Names

    The Java 2 SDK Security API requires and uses a set of standard names for algorithms, certificate and keystore types. This specification establishes the following names as standard names.

    In some cases naming conventions are suggested for forming names that are not explicitly listed, to facilitate name consistency across provider implementations. Such suggestions use items in angle brackets (such as <digest> and <encryption>) as placeholders to be replaced by specific message digest, encryption algorithm, and other names.

    Note: Algorithm names are not case-sensitive.
    This appendix includes corresponding lists of standard names relevant to the various security subareas:

    See Appendix B for algorithm specifications.

    Message Digest Algorithms

    The algorithm names in this section can be specified when generating an instance of MessageDigest.

    MD2: The MD2 message digest algorithm as defined in RFC 1319.

    MD5: The MD5 message digest algorithm as defined in RFC 1321.

    SHA-1: The Secure Hash Algorithm, as defined in Secure Hash Standard, NIST FIPS 180-1.

    SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512: New hash algorithms for which the draft Federal Information Processing Standard 180-2, Secure Hash Standard (SHS) is now available. SHA-256 is a 256-bit hash function intended to provide 128 bits of security against collision attacks, while SHA-512 is a 512-bit hash function intended to provide 256 bits of security. A 384-bit hash may be obtained by truncating the SHA-512 output.

    Key and Parameter Algorithms

    The algorithm names in this section can be specified when generating an instance of KeyPairGenerator, KeyFactory, AlgorithmParameterGenerator, and AlgorithmParameters.

    DSA: The Digital Signature Algorithm as defined in FIPS PUB 186.

    RSA: The RSA encryption algorithm as defined in PKCS #1.

    Digital Signature Algorithms

    The algorithm names in this section can be specified when generating an instance of Signature.

    ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm), an authentication mechanism described in ECC Cipher Suites for TLS (January 2004 draft).

    MD2withRSA: The MD2 with RSA Encryption signature algorithm which uses the MD2 digest algorithm and RSA to create and verify RSA digital signatures as defined in PKCS #1.

    MD5withRSA: The MD5 with RSA Encryption signature algorithm which uses the MD5 digest algorithm and RSA to create and verify RSA digital signatures as defined in PKCS #1.

    NONEwithDSA: This signature algorithm accepts direct raw data to be signed and uses DSA to create and verify DSA digital signatures as defined in FIPS PUB 186. The data must be exactly 20 bytes in length. This algorithms is also known under the alias name of RawDSA.

    SHA1withDSA: The DSA with SHA-1 signature algorithm which uses the SHA-1 digest algorithm and DSA to create and verify DSA digital signatures as defined in FIPS PUB 186.

    SHA1withRSA: The signature algorithm with SHA-1 and the RSA encryption algorithm as defined in the OSI Interoperability Workshop, using the padding conventions described in PKCS #1.

    <digest>with<encryption>: Use this to form a name for a signature algorithm with a particular message digest (such as MD2 or MD5) and algorithm (such as RSA or DSA), just as was done for the explicitly-defined standard names in this section (MD2withRSA, etc.). For the new signature schemes defined in PKCS #1 v 2.0, for which the <digest>with<encryption> form is insufficient, <digest>with<encryption>and<mgf> can be used to form a name. Here, <mgf> should be replaced by a mask generation function such as MGF1. Example: MD5withRSAandMGF1.

    Random Number Generation (RNG) Algorithms

    The algorithm names in this section can be specified when generating an instance of SecureRandom.

    SHA1PRNG: The name of the pseudo-random number generation (PRNG) algorithm supplied by the SUN provider. This implementation follows the IEEE P1363 standard, Appendix G.7: "Expansion of source bits", and uses SHA-1 as the foundation of the PRNG. It computes the SHA-1 hash over a true-random seed value concatenated with a 64-bit counter which is incremented by 1 for each operation. From the 160-bit SHA-1 output, only 64 bits are used.

    Certificate Types

    The types in this section can be specified when generating an instance of CertificateFactory.

    X.509: The certificate type defined in X.509.

    Keystore Types

    The types in this section can be specified when generating an instance of KeyStore.

    JKS: The name of the keystore implementation provided by the SUN provider.

    PKCS12: The transfer syntax for personal identity information as defined in PKCS #12.

    Service Attributes

    A cryptographic service is always associated with a particular algorithm or type. For example, a digital signature service is always associated with a particular algorithm (e.g., DSA), and a CertificateFactory service is always associated with a particular certificate type (e.g., X.509).

    The attributes in this section are for cryptographic services. The service attributes can be used as filters for selecting providers.

    Both the attribute name and value are case insensitive.

    KeySize: The maximum key size that the provider supports for the cryptographic service.

    ImplementedIn: Whether the implementation for the cryptographic service is done by software or hardware. The value of this attribute is "software" or "hardware".

    The JCE API requires and utilizes a set of standard names for algorithms, algorithm modes, and padding schemes. This specification establishes the following names as standard names. It supplements the list of standard names defined in Appendix A in the JavaTM Cryptography Architecture API Specification & Reference. Note that algorithm names are treated case-insensitively.

    In some cases naming conventions are suggested for forming names that are not explicitly listed, to facilitate name consistency across provider implementations. Such suggestions use items in angle brackets (such as <digest> and <encryption>) as placeholders to be replaced by specific message digest, encryption algorithm, and other names.

    Cipher

    Algorithm

    The following names can be specified as the algorithm component in a transformation when requesting an instance of Cipher:

    • AES: Advanced Encryption Standard as specified by NIST in a draft FIPS. Based on the Rijndael algorithm by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, AES is a 128-bit block cipher supporting keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits.

    • ARCFOUR/RC4: A stream cipher developed by Ron Rivest. For more information, see K. Kaukonen and R. Thayer, "A Stream Cipher Encryption Algorithm 'Arcfour'", Internet Draft (expired), draft-kaukonen-cipher-arcfour-03.txt.

    • Blowfish: The block cipher designed by Bruce Schneier.

    • DES: The Digital Encryption Standard as described in FIPS PUB 46-2.

    • DESede: Triple DES Encryption (DES-EDE).

    • ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme)

    • PBEWith<digest>And<encryption> or PBEWith<prf>And<encryption>: The password-based encryption algorithm (PKCS #5), using the specified message digest (<digest>) or pseudo-random function (<prf>) and encryption algorithm (<encryption>). Examples:

      • PBEWithMD5AndDES: The password-based encryption algorithm as defined in: RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #5: Password-Based Encryption Standard," version 1.5, Nov 1993. Note that this algorithm implies CBC as the cipher mode and PKCS5Padding as the padding scheme and cannot be used with any other cipher modes or padding schemes.

      • PBEWithHmacSHA1AndDESede: The password-based encryption algorithm as defined in: RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Standard," version 2.0, March 1999.

    • RC2, RC4, and RC5: Variable-key-size encryption algorithms developed by Ron Rivest for RSA Data Security, Inc.

    • RSA: The RSA encryption algorithm as defined in PKCS #1.

    Mode

    The following names can be specified as the mode component in a transformation when requesting an instance of Cipher:

    • NONE: No mode.

    • CBC: Cipher Block Chaining Mode, as defined in FIPS PUB 81.

    • CFB: Cipher Feedback Mode, as defined in FIPS PUB 81.

    • ECB: Electronic Codebook Mode, as defined in: The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) PUB 81, "DES Modes of Operation," U.S. Department of Commerce, Dec 1980.

    • OFB: Output Feedback Mode, as defined in FIPS PUB 81.

    • PCBC: Propagating Cipher Block Chaining, as defined by Kerberos V4.

    Padding

    The following names can be specified as the padding component in a transformation when requesting an instance of Cipher:

    • ISO10126Padding. This padding for block ciphers is described in 5.2 Block Encryption Algorithms in the W3C's "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing" document.

    • NoPadding: No padding.

    • OAEPWith<digest>And<mgf>Padding: Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding scheme defined in PKCS #1, where <digest> should be replaced by the message digest and <mgf> by the mask generation function. Example: OAEPWithMD5AndMGF1Padding.

    • PKCS5Padding: The padding scheme described in: RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #5: Password-Based Encryption Standard," version 1.5, November 1993.

    • SSL3Padding: The padding scheme defined in the SSL Protocol Version 3.0, November 18, 1996, section 5.2.3.2 (CBC block cipher): 
          block-ciphered struct {
              opaque content[SSLCompressed.length];
              opaque MAC[CipherSpec.hash_size];
              uint8 padding[GenericBlockCipher.padding_length];
              uint8 padding_length;
          } GenericBlockCipher;

      The size of an instance of a GenericBlockCipher must be a multiple of the block cipher's block length.

      The padding length, which is always present, contributes to the padding, which implies that if: 

          sizeof(content) + sizeof(MAC) % block_length = 0,
      padding has to be (block_length - 1) bytes long, because of the existence of padding_length.

      This make the padding scheme similar (but not quite) to PKCS5Padding, where the padding length is encoded in the padding (and ranges from 1 to block_length). With the SSL scheme, the sizeof(padding) is encoded in the always present padding_length and therefore ranges from 0 to block_length-1.

      Note that this padding mechanism is not supported by the "SunJCE" provider.

    KeyAgreement

    The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting an instance of KeyAgreement:

    KeyGenerator

    The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting an instance of KeyGenerator:

    KeyPairGenerator

    The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting an instance of KeyPairGenerator:

    SecretKeyFactory

    The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting an instance of SecretKeyFactory:

    KeyFactory

    The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting an instance of KeyFactory:

    AlgorithmParameterGenerator

    The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting an instance of AlgorithmParameterGenerator:

    AlgorithmParameters

    The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting an instance of AlgorithmParameters:

    MAC

    The following algorithm names can be specified when requesting an instance of Mac:

    Keystore Types

    The following types can be specified when requesting an instance of KeyStore:

    Exemption Mechanisms

    The following exemption mechanism names can be specified in the permission policy file that accompanies an application considered "exempt" from cryptographic restrictions:

    Appendix B: SunJCE Default Keysizes

    The SunJCE provider uses the following default keysizes:

    Appendix C: SunJCE Keysize Restrictions

    The SunJCE provider enforces the following restrictions on the keysize passed to the initialization methods of the following classes:

    Appendix D: Jurisdiction Policy File Format

    JCE represents its jurisdiction policy files as J2SE-style policy files with corresponding permission statements. As described in Default Policy Implementation and Policy File Syntax, a J2SE policy file specifies what permissions are allowed for code from specified code sources. A permission represents access to a system resource. In the case of JCE, the "resources" are cryptography algorithms, and code sources do not need to be specified, because the cryptographic restrictions apply to all code.

    A jurisdiction policy file consists of a very basic "grant entry" containing one or more "permission entries." 

    grant {
        <permission entries>;
    };

    The format of a permission entry in a jurisdiction policy file is: 

    permission <crypto permission class name>[ <alg_name>
        [[, <exemption mechanism name>][, <maxKeySize>
        [, <AlgorithmParameterSpec class name>,
        <parameters for constructing an 
            AlgorithmParameterSpec object>]]]];

    A sample jurisdiction policy file that includes restricting the "Blowfish" algorithm to maximum key sizes of 64 bits is: 

    grant {
        permission javax.crypto.CryptoPermission "Blowfish", 64;
        . . .;
    };

    A permission entry must begin with the word permission. The <crypto permission class name> in the template above would actually be a specific permission class name, such as javax.crypto.CryptoPermission. A crypto permission class reflects the ability of an application/applet to use certain algorithms with certain key sizes in certain environments. There are two crypto permission classes: CryptoPermission and CryptoAllPermission. The special CryptoAllPermission class implies all cryptography-related permissions, that is, it specifies that there are no cryptography-related restrictions.

    The <alg_name>, when utilized, is a quoted string specifying the standard name (see Appendix A) of a cryptography algorithm, such as "DES" or "RSA".

    The <exemption mechanism name>, when specified, is a quoted string indicating an exemption mechanism which, if enforced, enables a reduction in cryptographic restrictions. Exemption mechanism names that can be used include "KeyRecovery" "KeyEscrow", and "KeyWeakening".

    <maxKeySize> is an integer specifying the maximum key size (in bits) allowed for the specified algorithm.

    For some algorithms it may not be sufficient to specify the algorithm strength in terms of just a key size. For example, in the case of the "RC5" algorithm, the number of rounds must also be considered. For algorithms whose strength needs to be expressed as more than a key size, the permission entry should also specify an AlgorithmParameterSpec class name (such as javax.crypto.spec.RC5ParameterSpec) and a list of parameters for constructing the specified AlgorithmParameterSpec object.

    Items that appear in a permission entry must appear in the specified order. An entry is terminated with a semicolon.

    Case is unimportant for the identifiers (grant, permission) but is significant for the <crypto permission class name> or for any string that is passed in as a value.

    Note: An "*" can be used as a wildcard for any permission entry option. For example, an "*" (without the quotes) for an <alg_name> option means "all algorithms."

    Appendix E: Maximum Key Sizes Allowed by "Strong" Jurisdiction Policy Files

    Due to import control restrictions, the jurisdiction policy files shipped with the J2SE 5 Development Kit allow "strong" but limited cryptography to be used. Here are the maximum key sizes allowed by this "strong" version of the jurisdiction policy files:

    Algorithm

    Maximum Key Size

    DES

    64

    DESede

    *

    RC2

    128

    RC4

    128

    RC5

    128

    RSA

    2048

    * (all others)

    128

    Appendix B: Algorithms

    This appendix specifies details concerning some of the algorithms defined in Appendix A. Any provider supplying an implementation of the listed algorithms must comply with the specifications in this appendix.

    Note: The most recent version of this document is available online at: http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/guide/security/index.html.

    To add a new algorithm not specified here, you should first survey other people or companies supplying provider packages to see if they have already added that algorithm, and, if so, use the definitions they published, if available. Otherwise, you should create and make available a template, similar to those found in this Appendix B, with the specifications for the algorithm you provide.

    Specification Template

    The following table shows the fields of the algorithm specifications.
    Field Description
    Name The name by which the algorithm is known. This is the name passed to the getInstance method (when requesting the algorithm), and returned by the getAlgorithm method to determine the name of an existing algorithm object. These methods are in the relevant engine classes: Signature, MessageDigest, KeyPairGenerator, and AlgorithmParameterGenerator.
    Type The type of algorithm: Signature, MessageDigest, KeyPairGenerator, or ParameterGenerator.
    Description General notes about the algorithm, including any standards implemented by the algorithm, applicable patents, etc.
    KeyPair Algorithm (optional) The keypair algorithm for this algorithm.
    Keysize (optional) For a keyed algorithm or key generation algorithm: the legal keysizes.

    Size (optional)

    		 For an algorithm parameter generation algorithm: the legal "sizes" for algorithm parameter generation.

    Parameter Defaults (optional)

    		 For a key generation algorithm: the default parameter values.

    Signature Format (optional)

    		 For a Signature algorithm, the format of the signature, that is, the input and output of the verify and sign methods, respectively.

    Algorithm Specifications

    SHA-1 Message Digest Algorithm

    Name SHA-1
    Type MessageDigest
    Description The message digest algorithm as defined in NIST's FIPS 180-1. The output of this algorithm is a 160-bit digest.

    MD2 Message Digest Algorithm

    Name MD2
     Type MessageDigest
    Description The message digest algorithm as defined in RFC 1319. The output of this algorithm is a 128-bit (16 byte) digest.

    MD5 Message Digest Algorithm

    Name MD5
    Type MessageDigest
    Description The message digest algorithm as defined in RFC 1321. The output of this algorithm is a 128-bit (16 byte) digest.

    The Digital Signature Algorithm

    Name SHA1withDSA
    Type Signature
    Description This algorithm is the signature algorithm described in NIST FIPS 186, using DSA with the SHA-1 message digest algorithm.
    KeyPair Algorithm DSA
    Signature Format ASN.1 sequence of two INTEGER values: r and s, in that order:
    SEQUENCE ::= { r INTEGER, s INTEGER }

    RSA-based Signature Algorithms, with MD2, MD5 or SHA-1

    Names MD2withRSA, MD5withRSA and SHA1withRSA
    Type Signature
    Description These are the signature algorithms that use the MD2, MD5, and SHA-1 message digest algorithms (respectively) with RSA encryption.
    KeyPair Algorithm
    RSA
    Signature Format DER-encoded PKCS #1 block as defined in RSA Laboratory's Public Key Cryptography Standards Note #1. The data encrypted is the digest of the data signed.

    DSA KeyPair Generation Algorithm

    Name DSA
    Type KeyPairGenerator
    Description This algorithm is the key pair generation algorithm described in NIST FIPS 186 for DSA.
    Keysize The length, in bits, of the modulus p. This must range from 512 to 1024, and must be a multiple of 64. The default keysize is 1024.
    Parameter Defaults

    The following default parameter values are used for keysizes of 512, 768, and 1024 bits:

    512-bit Key Parameters
    SEED = b869c82b 35d70e1b 1ff91b28 e37a62ec dc34409b
counter = 123
p = fca682ce 8e12caba 26efccf7 110e526d b078b05e decbcd1e b4a208f3
    ae1617ae 01f35b91 a47e6df6 3413c5e1 2ed0899b cd132acd 50d99151
    bdc43ee7 37592e17
q = 962eddcc 369cba8e bb260ee6 b6a126d9 346e38c5
         
g = 678471b2 7a9cf44e e91a49c5 147db1a9 aaf244f0 5a434d64 86931d2d
    14271b9e 35030b71 fd73da17 9069b32e 2935630e 1c206235 4d0da20a
    6c416e50 be794ca4
    768-bit key parameters
    SEED = 77d0f8c4 dad15eb8 c4f2f8d6 726cefd9 6d5bb399
counter = 263
p = e9e64259 9d355f37 c97ffd35 67120b8e 25c9cd43 e927b3a9 670fbec5
    d8901419 22d2c3b3 ad248009 3799869d 1e846aab 49fab0ad 26d2ce6a
    22219d47 0bce7d77 7d4a21fb e9c270b5 7f607002 f3cef839 3694cf45
    ee3688c1 1a8c56ab 127a3daf
q = 9cdbd84c 9f1ac2f3 8d0f80f4 2ab952e7 338bf511
g = 30470ad5 a005fb14 ce2d9dcd 87e38bc7 d1b1c5fa cbaecbe9 5f190aa7
    a31d23c4 dbbcbe06 17454440 1a5b2c02 0965d8c2 bd2171d3 66844577
    1f74ba08 4d2029d8 3c1c1585 47f3a9f1 a2715be2 3d51ae4d 3e5a1f6a
    7064f316 933a346d 3f529252
    1024-bit key parameters
    SEED = 8d515589 4229d5e6 89ee01e6 018a237e 2cae64cd
counter = 92
p = fd7f5381 1d751229 52df4a9c 2eece4e7 f611b752 3cef4400 c31e3f80
    b6512669 455d4022 51fb593d 8d58fabf c5f5ba30 f6cb9b55 6cd7813b
    801d346f f26660b7 6b9950a5 a49f9fe8 047b1022 c24fbba9 d7feb7c6
    1bf83b57 e7c6a8a6 150f04fb 83f6d3c5 1ec30235 54135a16 9132f675
    f3ae2b61 d72aeff2 2203199d d14801c7
q = 9760508f 15230bcc b292b982 a2eb840b f0581cf5
         
g = f7e1a085 d69b3dde cbbcab5c 36b857b9 7994afbb fa3aea82 f9574c0b
    3d078267 5159578e bad4594f e6710710 8180b449 167123e8 4c281613
    b7cf0932 8cc8a6e1 3c167a8b 547c8d28 e0a3ae1e 2bb3a675 916ea37f
    0bfa2135 62f1fb62 7a01243b cca4f1be a8519089 a883dfe1 5ae59f06
    928b665e 807b5525 64014c3b fecf492a

    RSA KeyPair Generation Algorithm

    Names RSA
    Type KeyPairGenerator
    Description This algorithm is the key pair generation algorithm described in PKCS #1.
    Strength Any integer that is a multiple of 8, greater than or equal to 512.

    DSA Parameter Generation Algorithm

    Names DSA
    Type ParameterGenerator
    Description This algorithm is the parameter generation algorithm described in NIST FIPS 186 for DSA.
    Strength The length, in bits, of the modulus p. This must range from 512 to 1024, and must be a multiple of 64. The default size is 1024.

    Appendix F: Sample Programs